Jim Chamberlain (he/him)

My research covers three areas, united by my interest in the (meta)ethical implications of our best understanding of the psychology of moral judgement. My first area of research focuses on the philosophy of David Hume. I argue, among other things, that Hume understands moral judgements as feelings or sentiments, which automatically occur to us whenever we contemplate token 'mental qualities' of any types that we generally associate with causing pleasure or displeasure. For example, if we think that someone has a benevolent desire then we will experience a feeling of moral approval, simply because we generally associate benevolence with causing pleasure.

My work on metaethics draws on this reading of Hume. I broadly endorse quasi-realist expressivism: roughly, the view that moral sentences express moral attitudes rather than moral beliefs, but that we nevertheless rightly talk of moral facts and moral truths. I also endorse the Humean thesis that typical moral judgements are or include affective intuitions – fast, automatic, non-conscious responses – which rely on associative learning processes. Combining the two theses, I argue that there are some important disanalogies between moral and non-moral epistemology. For example, I have argued that we can be justified in remaining steadfast in our moral judgements even if we know that most people disagree with us, and that we would not be justified in being so confident about similarly controversial non-moral judgements.

Finally, I work on questions about injustices in the prison system, and on the potential for philosophy to help mitigate such injustices. Along with Antony Duff (Professor of Philosophy Emeritus, University of Stirling) and MM McCabe (Professor of Ancient Philosophy Emerita, King’s College London), I am leading a research project called ‘Prison Voices’. This project explores how the criminal justice system may silence the voices of those engaged in it, how and why this constitutes an injustice, and how this is a particular concern within the prison system. For example, I have argued that the affective, intuitive nature of moral judgement means that we can learn important moral and political truths from the testimony of prisoners and other members of marginalised groups.