

The “Xinjiang Papers”:

How Xi Jinping commands policy in the
People’s Republic of China



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Glossary of terms

Communist Party of China (CCP)

Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).

National People's Congress (NPC)

People's Armed Police (PAP)

People's Liberation Army (PLA)

People's Republic of China (PRC)

Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC)

Public Security Bureau (PSB)

United Front Working Department (UFWD)

Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) (*Bingtuan*)

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)

Executive Summary

This report shows how “the Xinjiang papers” reveal the centralised decision-making processes behind mass mobilisation, mass detention, and dispersal of Uyghur and other Turkic-speaking Muslim communities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The report explains the thinking and mechanisms behind Xi Jinping’s Xinjiang policy, which targets signs of everyday Uyghur identity as security threats. It provides new evidence of centrally directed local implementation of mass detention (section 4.2) and arbitrary dispersal of Uyghur communities (4.3). The report shows how Xi is transforming the PRC’s political system towards a totalitarian model based on personalised rule, mass mobilisation and surveillance, ideological education, and transformation of thought.

Xi has centralised China’s political system by designing and implementing institutional co-ordination and supervision mechanisms that use material punishments and rewards to prevent organisations and officials from acting outside central policy commands, or from displaying signs of thinking outside his ideological framework of correct Chinese identity and history. Xi’s micro-managed policy implementation prevents any opposition to genocidal practices, including cultural destruction (section 3: “Sinicisation” policy), arbitrary mass detention (4.2) and community dispersal (4.3). Mass human surveillance links party institutions, security services, and neighbourhoods in the “People’s war on terror” (4.1). Xi’s focus on policing everyday thought is strictly imposed through regular party meetings and education sessions for cadres and security personnel, which outline his ideological principles and severe punishments for alternative thought or failing to implement his personal orders (section 2). The policy approach of democratic states towards the PRC under Xi Jinping requires new longer-term, strategic planning that is realistic about the PRC’s power and its domestic and international goals under Xi Jinping, who views international political and economic relationships as a means towards maintaining personalised totalitarian rule and enacting genocide.

Introduction

Under Xi Jinping's rule of the People's Republic of China (PRC), at least [one million](#) Turkic-speaking Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) have been extralegally detained in camps, subjected to invasive [surveillance](#), [sexual violence](#), [child-separation](#), and [psychological trauma](#). Nearly 10 million Uyghurs and Kazakhs outside the camps navigate networks of [checkpoints](#), [interpersonal monitoring](#), [hi-tech surveillance](#), and [forced labour](#). The dangers of conducting research in this environment mean that significant policy information comes from government document leaks, including the '[Karakax List](#)' and '[China Cables](#)'. These provided invaluable evidence on policy practices of the Communist Party of China (CCP) but less on the party-state's decision-making processes.

The '[Xinjiang Papers](#)' leak, acquired by the London-based [Uyghur Tribunal](#), was analysed by [Adrian Zenz](#) and reviewed by [David Tobin](#) and [James Millward](#). A [public hearing](#) discussed the content of the papers with full document transcripts available to all. Significant international media coverage followed, from [the BBC](#), [Wall Street Journal](#), [the Guardian](#), and [Vice](#), alongside op-ed essays in [the Conversation](#) and [RUSI](#). No challenges on matters of fact were made. Unlike prior leaks, these papers revealed the CCP's centralised chain of command and Xi Jinping's micro-managed supervision of daily policy implementation in the XUAR.

This report provides policymakers and researchers with deeper analysis of “the Xinjiang papers,” to explain what they reveal about the practical operation of China's political system under Xi, and how he commands policy in Xinjiang. The report explains:

- The thinking behind Xi's micro-managed Xinjiang policy.
- Institutional shifts towards totalitarianism to ensure policy implementation.
- The arbitrary nature of mass detention and community dispersal of Uyghurs and other Turkic-speaking Muslims.

The report explains the policy content of the “Xinjiang papers” and Xi Jinping’s thinking behind those policies in the context of the CCP’s increasingly centralised command structure. It also provides newly obtained evidence on the implementation of mass detention and human surveillance in Xinjiang. This includes prefectural and county-level government documents on policy implementation rules and a list of mass detentions leaked from police databases in southern Xinjiang. Additional evidence on policy implementation also includes documentation of party-state and security personnel meetings to enforce Xi’s commands, Chinese state media coverage of their contents, and testimonies from Xi’s mass detention system. Hyperlinks are used for convenience, which primarily refer to evidence of the centralised supervision process of policy implementation.

The report will show how “the Xinjiang papers” reveal the centralised decision-making processes behind mass mobilisation (“the People’s war on terror”), mass detention (“round up all those who should be rounded up”), and the dispersal of Uyghur communities (“population optimisation”) in the XUAR. It will deepen analytical and practical understanding of the PRC’s institutional and ideological control mechanisms, which policymakers interact with in all relations with officially recognised PRC organisations. The report will demonstrate how Xi Jinping has centralised and personalised China’s political system by designing and implementing institutional co-ordination and supervision mechanisms, and using material punishments and rewards, to prevent organisations and officials from acting outside central policy commands, or from displaying signs of thinking outside his ideological framework of correct Chinese identity and history. Xi’s transformation of the PRC’s institutions and Chinese society are broadly ‘working’ in the short-term because the constructed mechanisms of human surveillance are so extensive and the costs of failing to obey orders are so high.

What are the Xinjiang Papers?

The ‘Xinjiang Papers’ include Xi Jinping’s April 2014 speeches, while “[inspecting Xinjiang](#)” and chairing the “[2nd Central Xinjiang Work Forum](#),” which ordered his ethnic and security policy framework to be implemented as “new conditions.”

They also include speeches on implementation by his appointed Xinjiang party chief, Chen Quanguo (“[Required knowledge and skills](#),” “[plenary sessions](#),” and “[stability maintenance](#)”). Central Party Committee commands include “[managing religious activities](#),” the “[southward development plan](#)” for the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (hereafter: the *Bingtuan*), and monitoring cadres and citizens’ teaching, thinking, and behaviour regarding “[historical issues](#).”

The papers also disclose the subsequent “violations of discipline” (March, 2018) by Party commission chair for Shache county, [Wang Yongzhi](#), and Aksu county party commission chair, [Gu Wensheng](#), described as related “lessons and warnings” for cadres’ policy implementation and their livelihoods. Most documents were sent to all tiers of government down to the county level. The policy content corresponds with observations by Xinjiang-focused scholars and international media in mass detentions, mosque demolitions, coercive birth controls, forced labour, “population optimisation” as euphemism for dispersal of Uyghurs, and “Sinicisation of religion” policy. However, the papers provide clear documentary evidence that these specific practices are designed and extensively monitored by the central party-state.

The original documents and their transcriptions were reviewed by David Tobin and James Millward. Adrian Zenz’ detailed [authentication methods](#) included comparison with the related New York Times “[absolutely no mercy](#)” leak, crosschecking against publicly available documents, locating sources that quote the documents, tracking use of repeated terms across documents, and verifying official formatting. Quotes and direct references to the documents are found online but not the full texts. It is standard practice in PRC state-media (e.g., *Xinhua*, CCTV, etc) to report on key speeches by referencing documents and key quotes without releasing the documents. For example, the 2010 Xinjiang Working Group Meetings to assess policy responses after the 2009 Ürümqi violence were widely quoted as a policy turning point but without making these documents available.

The [judgement](#) of the Uyghur Tribunal explains that the source of the leak requested full anonymity and the original documents cannot be released to protect

their safety. These types of materials are widely disseminated and studied by cadres at all levels of the PRC government. The content also repeats standard concepts and policies (e.g., “Sinicisation,” “Three Evils,” “Great Revival”), which circulate widely in official media, party announcements, local news on cadre meetings, “patriotic education” texts, and political slogans. This verifies the paper’s authenticity but means their source is unidentifiable.

1. How does Xi command policy in Xinjiang?

The PRC's political system is a centralised party-state, with no meaningful separation of the government (*zhengfu* 政府) from ruling party (*zhongyang* 中央). All strategic decision-making is made by the party while the state manages the daily affairs of government in accordance with party policy.¹ The party elicits and can respond to public opinion through institutional mechanisms, including the 'legislature', the [National People's Congress](#) (NPC) and the [Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference](#) (CPPCC). Under Hu Jintao's leadership (2002-2012), the [Politburo Standing Committee](#) (PBSC) was widely understood inside and outside China as the most important decision-making body. Its system of "consultative Leninism" or "democratic centralism", used limited mechanisms for public contestation of policy but permitted frank discussions between party factions in private PBSC meetings.²

[Cross-posting](#), a key feature of the system, assigns individuals to multiple political posts with overlapping responsibilities, often in party and government roles, enabling everyday control by the party. Most prominent examples being Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CCP and President of the PRC, [Wang Yang](#) (PBSC 4th standing, CPPCC Standing Committee Party Secretary, CPPCC Standing Committee Chair), [Li Zhanshu](#) (PBSC 3rd standing, NPC Standing Committee Party Secretary, NPC Standing Committee chair), and [Wang Junzheng](#) (XUAR Vice President, Bingtuan Party Commission secretary).

Cross-posting enables everyday monitoring and supervision by central party organs over government and cadres. Cross-posting is coupled with '[vertical responsibility](#)' in which low-level cadres are appointed by senior cadres to whom they must report.

¹ This is standard knowledge and can be read in classic textbooks. For example: Saich, Tony (2015) [Governance and Politics of China](#). London: Palgrave; Shambaugh, David (2008) [China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation](#). Ewing, NJ: University of California Press.

² For example, see: Tsang, Steve (2015) '[Contextualising the China Dream: A Reinforced Consultative Leninist Approach to Government](#)', in Kerr, David (ed) [China's Many Dreams: Comparative Perspectives on China's Search for National Rejuvenation](#). London: Palgrave.

A cadre's direct superior is embedded in the same social network from which their reputation and authority is derived. These formal institutional arrangements and informal relationships mean challenging policy orders can present immediate material risk to cadres' relationships with their superiors and their political careers.

Xi Jinping has increasingly centralised and personalised the system since becoming the Party General Secretary in 2012, by [centralising](#) decision-making, [ending Presidential term limits](#), rapidly acceding to the [Central Military Commission](#) (CMC), and inscribing "[Xi Jinping Thought](#)" as a "guide to action" in the Party constitution. Additionally, corruption crackdowns that targeted political rivals, including former Minister for public security, [Zhou Yongkang](#), limit the system's capacity for internal policy contestation and constrain open discussion in the PBSC, the key mechanism to suggest alternative policy options.

The "Xinjiang Papers" provide detailed evidence of Xi's centralised construction of policy and the monitoring and enforcement of everyday implementation. The documents' chronology reflects how China's party-state operates through centralised commands, variable regional implementation, and responses by the centre to enforce implementation. In 2014, Xi gave orders to show "[absolutely no mercy](#)" (*haobu liuqing* 毫不留情) when implementing his new policies to resolve Xinjiang's problems and that "those who should be seized should be seized" (*gai zhuo de zhuo* 该抓的抓) in a "painful period of interventionary treatment" (*ganyu zhiliao zhentongqi* 干预治疗阵痛期). The XUAR government and Chen Quanguo subsequently issued orders in 2017 to "round up all those who should be rounded up" (*yingshou jinshou* 应收尽收). The [2018 XUAR Government Work Report](#), part of an annual report series which traditionally explains regional implementation of central policy, subsequently repeated both commands and outlined its implementation work.

In March 2018, the Central Party Committee's tone shifted from policy commands to punishments for local leaders who failed to fully implement them, with [Wang Yongzhi](#) and [Gu Wensheng](#), being expelled from the party for "violations of discipline." By April 2018, a meeting of the [XUAR Agriculture department party](#)

[committee](#), observed by Party organs, stressed the importance of implementing Xi’s “new ideas, party targets, and concrete demands,” and how to overcome “political errors.” Cadres studied document 9 outlining Wang Yongzhi’s punishments for specific “political errors” by failing to meet “party targets” in stability work and to “round up all those who should be rounded up.”



XUAR Agriculture Department Party Committee meeting studying implementation of Xi’s targets.

At the end of June, “[study materials](#)” on the punishments for Wang’s “political errors” were circulated and by December these were placed online for region-wide study. These demanded reinforcement of “comprehensive mechanisms” to deal with “warning signs” and implementation of “overall targets” including “stability work” and the human-surveillance “[becoming family](#)” campaign (*fanghuiju* 访惠聚), in which cadres spend periods living in every Uyghur household. The “Xinjiang Papers” show that the targeting of Uyghurs and other Turkic-speaking Muslims is systematic, centrally ordered and was subsequently intensified by central party directives threatening material punishments for local cadres and security personnel who fail to comply with these commands.

2. The supervision and study of policy implementation

Following Xi's 2014 "inspections" of Xinjiang, he demanded that "Xinjiang work" and "conducting effective ethnic work in Xinjiang under new conditions," requires "clear understanding of the problem," as explained in his speeches on "comprehensive implementation of the party's ethnic policy," and "self-implementation by cadres and the masses" (Xinjiang Papers, document 1, introduction and article 1): "Doing effective Xinjiang work first requires unification of the thought position of all cadres and the masses in the region" (doc 1, p.4). This section will show how the contents of the "Xinjiang Papers" were disseminated to demand strict implementation of Xi's policies of systematic, institutionally co-ordinated mass detention and community dispersal by cadres and security personnel. With accession of "Xi Jinping Thought" to the party's constitution as a "guide to action," the monitoring and supervision of everyday implementation and ideology have become central to Xi's party-state and his national security approach.



Prison and security staff in Ili, August 2017, study Xi Jinping thought and failures to implement policy by "[two-faced people](#)," particularly cadres who fail to fully implement Xi's policies.

Xi's emphasis on political stability and national security in his 2014 speeches (docs 1 and 2), were widely reported across state media, including [Xinhua](#) and

[Chinanews](#). They were also studied and publicly recirculated as guides to new policy implementation methods by party leaders and cadres, including speeches on “long-term stability” (*changzhi jiu'an* 长治久安), “resolutely grasping the party’s new Xinjiang policy,” and “ideology work,” by [Wang Rulin](#), (Jilin party committee chair) in 2014 and [Yu Zhengsheng](#) (former PBSC member) in 2015. By 2017, prisons across the region held education sessions, guided by the Xinjiang Prison Party committee, to study Xi Jinping thought in these specific speeches, including the national security threat of “[two-faced people](#),” a revived term from Mao Zedong’s era to describe counter-revolutionaries within the party. The “two-faced” accusation is used to arbitrarily detain and interrogate officials and security personnel for any potential signs of disloyalty, including one Uyghur policeman who died during interrogation, instigated because his daughter visited Norway (see: Appendix – Witness testimony).

In June 2017, the XUAR government issued [document 3](#) (“terrorist attacks in the UK”),³ ordering construction of “[convenience police stations](#),” for mass surveillance of everyday behaviour and to help “round up all who should be rounded up” for “transformation education.” This was distributed online and studied by cadres across the region, including media coverage by [security-focused journals](#), contrasting Xi’s policy against the UK government’s supposed failing “human rights over security” counter-terrorism approach (doc 3, p.2-3). The importance of strictly implementing Xi’s approach to “long-term stability” is widely stressed in public media coverage of [government work](#), demanding all cadres read Xi’s and Chen’s specific speeches from the “Xinjiang papers,” including orders to “round up all those who should be rounded up,” as noted in November 2017 cadre meetings in Fuhai/Burultuqay, [Altay prefecture](#) on “stability work” (*weiben gongzuo* 维稳工作). By November 18th, 2019, all prisons across the region held education sessions for staff to study the disseminated “important speeches of Xi Jinping,” including the “[spirit of the 19th Party Congress](#),” and Xi’s new “security spirit” (*anquan jingshen* 安全精神).

³ Full title: “Notice on Responding to the Stimulus and Impact of a Series of Terrorist Attacks in the UK and Further Strengthening the Counterterrorism and Stability Maintenance Work in the Region.”



Security staff from Ili prisons study Xi Jinping’s [“important speeches.”](#)



[Electronic displays](#) of Xi Jinping’s 19th Party Congress resolutions at Xinjiang’s prisons.

Xi’s insistence that all Xinjiang policy is related to national security and Chen Quanguo’s speech ordering cadres to “round up all those who should be rounded up” (document 8, p.7) are both repeated across [public media](#) and in regional policy reports, including the [Urumqi Hi-tech Industrial Development Zone 2018 annual report](#). In 2020, document 7’s “southward development plan,” including “population optimisation” (*youbua renkou* 优化人口) as a euphemism for dispersal of Uyghur communities was publicised in official media focusing on [infrastructure development](#). The document and “optimisation” policy are explicitly cited on [cadre](#)

[news sites](#) referencing the *Bingtuan*'s important "mission" and "responsibility" to implement these goals as Xi's strict "targets" and national security "strategy."

The content of documents 5 ("[historical issues](#)")⁴ and 10 ("[Islam work](#)")⁵ most explicitly target everyday identities as security matters and were widely studied at all levels of government and the security apparatus. Both documents were sent by the CCP Central Committee, the highest level of the party-state, to all city levels of government and to county-levels in Xinjiang, demonstrating how Xi's focus on ideological control is a larger campaign extending beyond Xinjiang. Document 5 was "classified" (*jimi* 机密) for 3 months and is a summary of meetings (*jiyao* 纪要) from February to August 2017 of the Xinjiang Work committee small working groups on "history, ethnicity, culture, religion, and 3-districts revolution." It was written under the guidance of Xi Jinping's "important targets" on "strengthening education on Xinjiang history, ethnic development, and evolution of religion."

The Central Party Committee's cover letter introduces document 5 ("historical issues") by emphasising the importance of identity and thought relating to history in all cadres' daily work to maintain political stability. Cadres are strictly ordered to act and monitor the masses everyday behaviour according to the document's narrative because "history is a textbook which helps understand the past, grasp the today, and establish the future" (doc 5, p.2). The cover letter uses Zhou Enlai and Mao's description of Xinjiang as a piece in China's geopolitical "strategic chess game," prior to official classification of Uyghurs as a Chinese ethnic minority (*shaoshu minzu* 少数民族):⁶ "all regions and departments must adopt thinking that co-ordinates all activities of the nation like moves in a game of chess" (*quanguo yipanqi sixiang* 全国一盘棋思想) (doc 5, p.3). Xi has rejuvenated chess thinking to

⁴ Full title: "Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP on forwarding the 'Minutes of the Informal Seminar on Several Historical Issues in Xinjiang by the Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group."

⁵ Full title: "No.10 Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing 'Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation."

⁶ Zhou, Enlai (1950) '*Renzhen Shixing Dang de Minzu Zhengce*' ('Earnestly implement Party *Minzu* Policy') in *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi* (ed) (2010) *Xinjiang Gongzuo Wenxian Xuanbian* ('Xinjiang Work – Selected Documents'), Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, p.63.

describe centralised co-ordination and management of all party policy implementation in “frontier” regions as security matters, including “ethnic policy.” During central party meetings on “Taiwan work” in January 2022, [Wang Yang](#) stressed that “all regions and departments must implement chess thinking.” Party-state study websites reference Xi’s 2014 speeches and produce essays reminding cadres of the importance of ideology and the strategic “[chess game](#)” to “understand problems” and conduct daily work related to stability and ethnicity.

Document 10, a series of “suggestions” (*yijian* 意见) from the Central Committee, is classified for 20 years, and sent to all levels of government and party, down to the county level. “Suggestions” are guides to action, serving as broad rules for cadre behaviour from the Central Party Committee. “Suggestions” create momentum in the party-state bureaucracy by pressuring cadres to explain behaviour and policy implementation through their ideological framework and in accordance with the outlined rules of institutional co-ordination. Document 10 was widely studied by officials, with “all cadres” ordered to “follow its spirit” and “all regions and related departments” expected to implement its “concrete measures” (doc 10, p.16). Document 10 relates document 5’s historical narrative to concrete implementations of policy targets and micro-level security management of religious practices and issues related to historical thought. It is a national-level document focusing on “Islam work,” approved by the XUAR government.

Documents 5 and 10 are quoted in state media and widely studied by cadres and students across the PRC, including Xinjiang. In September 2017, state media agency, Xinhua, reported how Yu Zhengsheng chaired meetings on “[Resolving Xinjiang’s historical problems](#)” to produce document 5, emphasising its key ideas must be studied nationwide. By April 2018, Xinjiang’s universities were using document 5 in “[concentrated education](#)” classes towards “long-term stability” amongst the masses. [Tianshanwang](#), an XUAR government news site, reprinted excerpts from the 3rd Xinjiang Working Group meetings in January 2021, quoting Xi on “Sinicisation of Islam” and “doing good Islamic work” as the basis of unity and stability, later reproduced by local government sites, including [Karimay](#).



“[Concentrated education](#)” of document 5 at Xinjiang Agriculture University.

Beyond Xinjiang, the document and contents were studied widely in regions with concentrated populations of religious followers. In September 2018, the [Dachuan local government, Sichuan](#) described document 10 as key to “studying central and provincial policy measures of religious work,” emphasising the need to study Xi Jinping thought and implement the central party’s strategy. By October 2019, the [Central Institute for Ethnic Administrators](#) and [Xi’an Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission](#)⁷ named “document 10” as cadres’ primary training document on religious policy and “Sinicisation of religion” in Ningxia and Xi’an. In November, Gansu province party committee chair and department head of the United Front Working Department, Ma Shengli, published an essay quoting Xi and explaining his “[leadership](#)” is the focus in resolving all “problems in governing the field of Islam”, and the “ideological foundation of the Sinicisation of religion.”

⁷ Link now removed.



“[Hubei Islamic circles](#) study how to implement the spirit of the central party’s *minzu* work.”

Late 2021 saw significant central government activity responding to these central party documents. By October, the [CCPCC UFWD site](#) summarised meetings of Islamic scholars in Hubei on “ethnic work”, describing the “overall direction of Sinicisation of religion” as the “guiding principle” of “Islam work” in “accordance with the road towards Socialism”. In early December, the [Chinese People’s Consultative Conference](#) ethnic and religious affairs committee publicised their meetings to study Xi’s speeches and “implementation of national religion work.” In December, the [China Islamic Association](#) held study meetings on how to “follow Xi Jinping’s leadership on Islam” and “implement the Sinicisation of religion”. Yuan Jiajun, Zhejiang party secretary, chaired a [Party standing committee](#) meeting on “Sinicising religion,” stressing the need for central party management and following Xi’s speeches on the issue. Guangxi University also issued public notifications of “[Religious policy regulations](#),” denouncing “evil sects” and the need to follow Xi’s leadership in the “fusion” of Chinese culture and religion.



[Xi's visit to Lhasa, Tibet, 2021.](#)



The “warm reception” of religious leaders to Xi’s policy at the “[national religion work meeting](#).”

PBSC member, [Wang Yang](#), chaired a national-level work forum in January 2022 for religious groups to explain how to “guide religious figures and followers” and “implement the demands of severe governance of religion.” This directly followed [Xi’s 2021 inspections of Tibet](#), explained as “paying attention” and “upholding our country’s Sinicisation of religion.” National television broadcaster, CCTV, reported on the “warm reception” given to Xi’s “[important speech](#)” at “national religion work meetings” in December. These relentless meetings and study sessions order cadres to implement centralised policy and follow procedural mechanisms to monitor society, including the cadres themselves, for signs of thinking outside central policy directives and their prescribed narratives of identity and history.

3. “Sinicisation” policy

This report now turns to the key policy content in “the Xinjiang papers”: cultural destruction (section 3), mass detention (4.1 and 4.2), and dispersal of Uyghur communities (4.3). In 2018, the Central Party committee’s notification on Sinicisation (*zhongguohua* 中国化) of religion policy announced that “doing good Islam work” was related to China’s “overall situation” and “political and ideological security” (doc 10, p.2). The central party-state demanded cadres “use socialism with Chinese characteristics theory to arm and fill minds” towards the “fusion” (*jiaorong* 交融) of all ethnic groups, “with all regions and departments coordinating all activities of the nation like moves in a game of chess” (doc 5, p.2-3). This section analyses “Sinicisation” policy, the underlying thinking on history, ethnicity, and religion behind “ideological work” (*yishi xingtai gongzuo* 意识形态工作) and Xinjiang policy, which explains mass detention and community dispersal of Uyghurs, and why everyday identities are treated as national security threats.

3.1 History: “Linked through blood”, “rooted in fertile soil”

The cover letter from the Central Party Committee on document 5 (“historical issues”) emphasises the importance of identity and thought in all cadres’ daily work and in maintaining political stability. The strengthening of all cadres and the masses’ “5 self-identifications” (*rentong* 认同)⁸ with “the land of our ancestors (*zuguo* 祖国), the Chinese nation (*Zhonghua minzu* 中华民族), Chinese culture (*Zhonghua wenhua* 中华文化),⁹ the CCP, and socialism with Chinese characteristics,” performs a “fundamental and decisive function in the struggle against separatism, the fight for the will of the people, and construction of long-term stability” (doc 5, p.2). The document’s lengthy historical narrative tells a story about relations between

⁸ “Self-identification” (*rentong*) is distinct from legal “identity” (*shenfen*), which is used in identity cards, and is explicitly related to everyday feelings of identity and here, political voluntarism.

⁹ “Chinese culture” (*Zhonghua wenhua*) is associated with the Han culture of the central plains and is distinct in meaning from “*Zhongguo wenhua*” (“the culture of China”).

Chinese and Uyghur identities, which guides cadres' implementation of concrete policy targets towards elimination of undesirable thought and signs of Islamic and Turkic identities, including domes and minarets on mosques and social activities based on historical "revisionism."

The document's six sections summarise its key content. *Territorial integrity*: "Xinjiang is an indivisible component of China's territory," *racialised Chinese identity*: "all Xinjiang's ethnic groups are members of the *Zhonghua minzu* (中华民族) family linked through blood," *culturalist nationalism*: "all Xinjiang's ethnic groups' culture are formative components of Chinese culture," *de-Islamicisation*: "Xinjiang is a multi-religious region," *criminalisation of Uyghur history*: "comprehensively and objectively understand the 'Three-districts revolution'," ¹⁰ and *centralised control of identity*: "uphold the *correct* national, historical, ethnic, cultural, and religious outlook (Xi Jinping's [five outlooks](#)). The document explains that self-identification of all cadres and the masses must accord with Xi Jinping's narrative of *Zhonghua minzu* and that alternative thinking on history is a form of separatist activity.

Although the document emphasises Xinjiang's inseparability from China, territory (*lingtu* 领土) is only used three times and sovereignty (*zhuquan* 主权 or *tongzhiquan* 统治权) does not appear, contrasted against "land of our ancestors" (*zuguo* 祖国) 11 times, and "Chinese nation" or race (*Zhonghua minzu*) 29 times. The PRC's indisputable *territorial integrity* is assumed but is not the focus of "historical issues" or any security threats. The opening passages tell cadres that official ideology is that "all ethnic groups are members of the big family of *Zhonghua minzu* linked together through blood," and "all Xinjiang's ethnic cultures are rooted in the fertile soil of Chinese civilisation" (*Zhonghua wenming* 中华文明) (doc 5, p.4). "The formation of the big family of *Zhonghua minzu* is based on plurality and unity" and its "multi-ethnic unification" (doc 5, p.5) was consolidated during the Qin-Han period (221-206 BCE) through "historical processes of contact, communication,

¹⁰ "3 districts revolution" (*sanqu geming* 三区革命) is an official term describing the second short-lived independent East Turkestan Republic (1944-1949), a multi-ethnic state based in Ili, as a movement towards the PLA's "peaceful liberation" of Xinjiang and integration into China.

and fusion,” with “Central Plains Han” as the primary “formative ethnic group” (doc 5, p10).

The text explains the roots of Uyghur identity are in Chinese civilisation and that claims to cultural separateness, including Islamic and Turkic identities are “anti-historical errors.” However, “since the 1970s and 80s, foreign Islamic fundamentalism and extremism have infiltrated and infested Xinjiang, becoming the main ideological root behind Xinjiang’s frequent terrorist activities” (doc 5, p.21). “Xinjiang has never been ‘East Turkestan’...the Turks became extinct (*xiaowang* 消亡) with the Turkic Khanate’s collapse in the mid-8th century ...the Turks in the North of our country left the historical stage” (doc 5, p.8-9).

Uyghurs’ Turkic identity is dismissed as inauthentic: “Uyghurs’ ancestors were oppressed by Turks,” and “Uyghurs are not descendants of the Turks and have no relationship with Turkey” (doc 5, p12). Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic-speaking groups “are absolutely not a formative component of a so-called “Turkic ethnicity”” (doc 5, p.13). The text explains that “from start to finish, the evolution of ethnic relations in the Xinjiang region has been connected to the evolution of all Chinese ethnic groups. All ethnic groups have experienced alienation and confrontation but more so, communication and fusion (*ronghe* 融合), with unity, cohesion, and common progress always the main direction” (doc 5, p13-14), even though “the long-term development of *Zhonghua minzu* has encountered countless internal contradictions and conflicts alongside external challenges and *threats*” (doc 5, p14).

Turkic-ness and Islam are considered foreign, violent impositions on harmonious Chinese civilisation that must now be Sinicised to protect China’s security and identity. “All of Xinjiang’s ethnic cultures are from start to finish, rooted in the fertile soil of Chinese civilisation”, and “Uyghur culture” has no roots in common with Islamic culture (doc 5, p.18). “Islamic culture comes from 7th century Arabic civilisation,” and “after Islam entered Xinjiang, this led to destruction of Xinjiang’s Buddhist cultures and artistic heritage of the time” (doc 5, p.19), the travel of which from India is unmentioned. The text explains that “Uyghur belief in Islam

did not come from the masses' own reform or conversion but is the result of holy war and class exploitation" (doc 5, p.21-22). East Turkestan is a "self-coined concept of Europeans," and "an attempt by separatist forces inside and outside to dismember China" (doc 5, p.9).

The text then turns to how contemporary Sinicisation policy will secure China from these foreign influences, because "strengthening self-identification with Chinese culture is the soul of cultural prosperity and development of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang" (doc 5, p.19). Only "upholding our country's Sinicisation direction" can "fit our country's socialist society," promote China's "historical traditions," "resist infiltration, and prevent all 'de-Sinicisation' tendencies" (doc 5, p.24). These "historical problems are huge conceptual problems," which relate to the "centripetal force of *Zhonghua minzu*," namely the attraction of Han culture and its absorption of minority identities, "maintaining victory in the field of ideology and the struggle against separatism," and "unified thought and actions around the central party's spirit" (doc 5, p.26). "All cadres must voluntarily resist words that distort Xinjiang history," "focus on belt-and-road building" (doc 5, p.27), and solve the "thought problem and scholar problem" of independent research in these areas, with monitoring and management to strengthen "ideology work" (doc 5, p.28).

This central committee document explains that Uyghur Turkic and Islamic identity is a foreign security threat and the root of violence in Xinjiang. Since the Ürümqi 2009 violence, university textbooks, such as [the 50 Whys](#), explained that Uyghurs are "not a Turkic" and "not an Islamic" group, which only the "three evils" (separatism, terrorism, and extremism) could think, thus identifying genuine Uyghur Turkic and Islamic identities as sources of violent terrorism to be defeated in the region. Since then, Xi Jinping's centralised production and monitoring of this narrative's circulation means that cadres across China are directly ordered by the Party central committee to monitor and manage "thought and actions," which may reflect those identities as national security threats to be Sinicised. Despite authoring propaganda texts that decry Uyghur identities as forms of terrorism, the "[Shanghai List](#)" detailed sentences given to the Uyghur authors of *the 50 Whys*

text. [Halmurat Ghopur](#) was sentenced to death as a “terrorist suspect,” and [Azat Sultan](#) was interned for 1 year as “two-faced” and involved in “terrorism.”

3.2 Ethnicity: “Ethnic work under new conditions”

Xi’s 2014 orders on “ethnic work (*minzu gongzuo* 民族工作) under new conditions,” are outlined in [document 1](#)¹¹ and [document 2](#)¹² of the “Xinjiang papers,” which were re-circulated in cadre meetings during 2016 in the build up to the high period of mass detention in 2017. Xi is clear that “Xinjiang is the frontline and combat theatre of fighting terrorism, infiltration, and separatism,” so all ethnic work is directly related to “social stability,” “long-term stability,” and the “overall situation of the whole nation’s development, unification of the motherland (*zuguo*), ethnic unity, national security, and great revival of the Chinese nation (*Zhonghua minzu*)” (doc 1, p.3). The “Xinjiang problem is long-term and complex,” so “the party’s “guiding thought must be maintained” (doc 2, p.5).

Xi’s 2014 speeches recounts prior visits to Xinjiang in 2003 and 2009 as Zhejiang party chief conducting “partnership assistance” programmes with Hotan. He explains that “Xinjiang work has always had an especially important strategic position in the overall situation of the party’s and government’s work” (doc 1, p.1). However, “over the last few years, under the party and government’s leadership,” and with “social stability and long-term stability work as its focus,” it is time to “face responsibilities of the new situation,” and “use this historic opportunity” to create Xi’s vision of a “socialist Xinjiang” (doc 1, p.2-3). However, “conducting effective Xinjiang work,” “must first use this position to unify the thinking of all cadres and the masses” (doc 1, p.4), including supervising and managing everyday thinking on history, ethnicity, and religion.

In this context, “new conditions” refer to Xi’s refocusing of “ethnic policy” from development to security work: “stability is the basis of development” and policy implementation “must grasp this primary contradiction (*zhuyao maodun* 主要矛盾)

¹¹ Title: “General Secretary Xi Jinping’s speeches while inspecting Xinjiang (April 28-30, 2014).”

¹² Title: “Speeches by Comrades Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, and Yu Zhengsheng at the second Central Xinjiang Work Forum (May 28-30, 2014).”

before others can be resolved,” because “when countries slide into chaos, development stops” (doc 1, p.4-5). Xi stresses that “the party has already decided that social stability and long-term stability is Xinjiang work’s main target” and a “strategic judgement” (doc 2, p.6). He leaves no doubt that cadres must urgently focus on “stability work” (*weiwen gongzuo* 维稳工作), which refers to intensive, ethnically targeted surveillance and security practices, such as security patrols and “becoming family” campaigns in Uyghur communities: “What is the main target of Xinjiang work? This question must be grasped first and thought through clearly...we must improve our grasp of the primary contradiction to be able to resolve any other contradictions” (doc 2, p.6).

Xi pressures cadres to implement his orders and incentivises them to err on the side of zealousness over caution: “the traditional and non-traditional threats we face are growing stronger, so we must take preventative measures, and resolve these problems at the roots, leaving evil unchecked spells ruin, and we cannot let the problem of obstructing national security form an atmosphere” (doc 1, p.6). Both of Xi’s 2014 speeches demand pre-emptive action, to “strike pre-emptively, strike when they show their heads, strike early, strike small, and strike any symptoms (*da miaotou* 打苗头) (doc 1, p.7; doc 2, p.8), placing cadres in little doubt about their targets and pressuring them to pre-emptively act on “symptoms” rather than crime or violence, to “make *laobaixing* (老百姓)¹³ feel safe and criminals feel terror” (doc 1, p.7). Cadres are ordered to “strike the first blow” against incontestable national security threats defined as thinking on identity and history, and in practice, encompassing innocuous everyday behaviour.

When Xi says, “the seeds are outside China, the soil is inside, and the market is online” (doc 2, p.7), he refers to cultural “infiltration” from outside and signs of identity and thought inside. These signs were outlined in the Xinjiang party committee’s “[75 signs of extremism](#),” posted online by the UFWD in 2017, including “advocating Xinjiang’s separation” (no.1), “resisting or attacking current policy and regulations” (no.2), “quit drinking and smoking” (no.10), and “purchase

¹³ *Laobaixing* translates as “common people” but in daily life, generally refers to ordinary Han people.

or storage of dumbbells, barbells, and boxing gloves” (no.33). These signs are studied and chanted in “pre-trial detention centres” (*kanshousuo* 看守所), with related informal examinations by prison staff contributing to determining people’s release or ongoing detainment.¹⁴ “Extremism” and “separatism” do not necessarily refer to armed organisations or even advocating independence but include numerous innocuous everyday behaviours, including exercise, or thinking that contravenes Xi’s orders on history and identity.

Xi’s 2014 speeches explain his thinking behind this implementation: “Xinjiang’s ethnic separatist forces use religious extremism as its thinking foundation, violent terrorism as its method, and ethnic separatism as its final goal” (doc 1, p.4). “The Xinjiang problem’s long-term character is the ethnic unity problem” (doc 2, p.12), and given that “material and spiritual problems are related,” “strengthening the ideological field in the struggle against ethnic separatism,” “has a decisive function” (doc 2, p.23). Xi explains how rooting out signs of thought and identities he deems ahistorical is core to counter-terrorism by rhetorically asking, “where in Xinjiang’s history is there a Turkic nation? The people in that area originally believed in Buddhism and were not Turks,” so “ideological work is basically the work of human beings, which must not only target the grassroots but also key points, such as intellectuals,” (doc 2, p.26), who play pivotal roles in cultural maintenance.

In Xi’s second Xinjiang central work forum speech, the section titled “comprehensively implement the party’s religion policy,” quotes Engels to describe religion as a “reflection of fantasies in people’s minds” and that “satisfying the needs of normal religion is an important measure to reduce illegal religious activities” (doc 2, p.17). Xi Jinping is clear that policy cannot immediately achieve the party’s goal of “[ethnic extinction](#)” (*minzu xiaowang* 民族消亡), a political narrative popular during the Cultural Revolution that refers to the purportedly inevitable and desirable process of the reduction in non-Han languages and religious practices. Nevertheless, “with development of social productivity,

¹⁴ *Anonymous* interview with released detainee (February 2022). Also mentioned in [Gulbahar Haiitiwaji](#)’s first-hand account of her extra-legal detention, [How I survived a Chinese re-education camp](#).

civilisational progress, and the raising of people's consciousness, the foundation and conditions of religion will be reduced, and will finally be extinct" (doc 2, p,18). Preserving and controlling religion and ethnicity in the short-term are, therefore, the means towards their longer-term elimination.

Xi explains how cadres' work is assessed: "looking at Xinjiang cadres, first look at their thinking and practical expressions of protecting unification of the motherland and resisting ethnic separatism," specifically noting the dangers of "two-faced people" amongst cadres, with "no exception" for any ethnic groups (doc 2, p.31). "Regarding the problem of 'de-extremification,' all party members and cadres of all ethnicities, at levels of the party and government" have "no excuses," a "red line" (doc 2, p.25).¹⁵ Xi judges cadre behaviour by how they monitor behavioural signs of threat related to identity. In their work to defeat separatism, cadres must "voluntarily resist words that distort Xinjiang history" and "unceasingly strengthen self-identification with the motherland (*zūguo*), *Zhonghua minzu*, Chinese culture, and socialism with Chinese characteristics" (doc 1, p.20).

As "the three evils often tie extremist religious ideology with ordinary religion, using tricks" (doc 2, p.25), and their "primary means are using cultural influence, propagating fake historical culture, and exaggerating cultural difference" (doc 1, p.20), cadres are pressured to examine signs of cultural difference as potential pre-emptive signs of terrorism to report to their superiors. Xi explains, the "red line must be clear" for cadres of *all* ethnicities that "religion cannot interfere with government or cadre's work" or with "ethnic unity and national unification" (doc 2, p.25). He then describes how cadres, with no professional training in psychology, must monitor people's emotions as signs of threat: "great attention must be paid" to "how with rapid changes in production and lifestyle, ethnic minorities' psychology may not be synchronised, and psychological problems such as anxiety, depression, and helplessness have increased" (doc 2, p.30).

¹⁵ "Red line" is a commonly used phrase to describe censorship and politically forbidden behaviour but is not ordinarily publicly stated by leaders.

Xi specifically targets Uyghur and other Muslim cadres as potential national security threats or “two-faced” with racialised slurs in both speeches, that “some people’s hearts lack the concepts of the party, the motherland, and ethnic unity concepts, so much so that they *eat mutton* while scolding the party” (doc 2, p.24); and that “with justice on one’s side, cadres must speak of the party’s kindness, national support, and the whole country’s support, and cannot *eat mutton* while scolding the party, the country, and the Han ethnic group” (doc 1, p.20).¹⁶ The 2014 speeches end with familiar themes of centralised management and punishment, specifically that China’s social stability and long-term stability “depend on the party’s overall control and co-ordinating all aspects of leadership functions” (doc 2, p.30). Xi reminds cadres that obeying his orders and reporting to their superiors as co-ordinated by central leadership are national security matters, failures of which can be punished severely, including “corruption” which must be reported immediately (doc 2, p.32).

Xi’s commands set cadres’ personal responsibilities to think about history and identity, and to monitor the thinking and feelings of other cadres and all civilians as national security matters, in a fixed institutional framework that demands people report on those pre-emptive signs of incorrect thinking for severe punishment or they can expect punishment on similar terms.

3.3 Religion: “Strengthening the management of religious affairs”

The specific methods of centralised “management” (*guanli* 管理) and “supervision” (*jiandu* 监督) of the Sinicisation of religion are outlined in “suggestions” from the central party committee (document 10),¹⁷ which tells a story of rising “religious fever”, waves of “de-Sinicisation”, “Saudi-isation”, and “Arab-isation” that demand stricter policies and implementation. Document 10 describes Chinese

¹⁶ “Eating mutton” refers to Uyghur cuisine and the Islamic pork taboo. The association of these terms with Uyghurs in Xinjiang is immediately obvious to Chinese readers.

¹⁷ Title: “Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing “Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation.” (April 19, 2018).”

Islam as “harmonious” but “global Islam” as a problem of “infiltration” (doc 10, p.2-3). Sinicisation, therefore, is needed for “political stability” and “ideological security” (doc 10, p.3). The document contains more specific policy details than most publicly available central party documents, for example, article 7 explains the “principle is no new construction or establishment of religious venues” and to maintain principles of “demolish many, build few, and merge mosque construction”¹⁸ (doc 10, p.6).

The document is a binding report on “basic implementation” problems of “Sinicisation” policies and the need to strengthen supervision of implementation. Article 1.2 describes “problems in grassroots Islam Work of not being able, willing, or daring to monitor”, therefore, “the party’s leadership of Islam work is being urgently strengthened” (p.3). The document repeatedly reminds cadres and local leaders to *implement, co-ordinate, and manage* according to central policy and law with the centre in command in the context of ineffective, uncoordinated, and non-standardised *management* (e.g., articles 6, 7, 10, 22-25). The document explains the need for greater and deeper education and monitoring of education in policy areas of ethnicity, religion, and “rule-by-law” (articles 6, 7, 12, 14, 23). The document demonstrates how specific policy practices of Sinicisation in Xinjiang are designed, disseminated, and implementation monitored by the top levels of the party-state. This matches existing knowledge of the PRC’s centralised political system: the centre commands, provinces implement variably, and the centre reins them in according to the issue’s gravity. The document’s function is to rein in local cadres and institutions to strictly follow Sinicisation policy commands and maintain “ideological security”.

¹⁸ *Chaiduo, jianshao, befang jiansi de yuanze* 拆多建少, 合坊建寺的原则.



Kargilik’s Grand Mosque, 2010s (left). Source: [Anon, “Kargilik’s Jame Mosque,” Mapio Net.](#) Kargilik’s renovated Grand Mosque, Sep 2018. Slogan: “love the party, love the country” (right). Source: [YY, “Kargilik Mosque.”](#)

The key “Sinicisation” policies described have been widely observed in Xinjiang, spreading to [Hui communities](#) across China, including article 7: “new construction of venues must be steered to city and village regulations and regulations on land use”, and “do not set up religious venues or temporary places of worship for single ethnic or religious groups” (doc 10, p.5-6). “Construction and renovation of activity venues must give prominence to Chinese style” (doc 10, p.10), while preventing “expansion of the ‘Halal’ concept” is described as related to national stability and “foodstuffs security” (doc 10, p.11). The prevention of “public security incidents” is discussed alongside how “large-scale activities based on historical revisionism or superfluous ahistorical traditions are not permitted” (doc 10, p.8), linking ideas about history and national security. The strengthening of “management and supervision” refers to an unlimited scope regarding everyday thinking and cultural practices in “scripture college’s teaching curriculum, teacher certification, student and staff recruitment scope, teaching outlines, use of teaching materials, funding sources, and other areas” (doc 10, p.13).

“Sinicisation” policy, which includes historical and ideological education, and mosque [demolitions](#) and [renovations](#) to remove minarets and other features deemed foreign, are constructed, implemented, and supervised by the top levels of the party-state as matters of national security. Xi’s speeches command leaders who co-ordinate institutional mechanisms and cadres who implement policy, reminding them of their responsibilities and the potential severity of punishment for failure:

“the management of religious affairs must be strengthened...and the attitude of cadres at every level of the party towards religion is extremely important to managing religious affairs” (doc 1, p.33). Xi’s stated intent of “ethnic extinction” and his thinking on Islamic and Turkic identities as foreign security threats strictly guides the implementation of policies of mass detention and community dispersal of Uyghurs and other Turkic-speaking Muslims in the “People’s War on Terror.”

4. Mass detention: “Round up all those who should be rounded up”

The system of mass detention of Uyghurs and other Turkic-speaking Muslims using internment camps, prisons, and pre-trial detention centres, where police and security personnel assess detainees before determining where they are imprisoned without trial, was developed under orders of Xi Jinping’s “ethnic work under new conditions.” Xi’s 2014 speech during “inspection of Xinjiang” explained the significance of all party work to national security, with the July 2009 violence described as “ethnic work” facing a “new situation” (doc 1, p.15) and a “painful period of interventionary treatment” (doc 1, p.3-4) as “the central party-state’s big judgement regarding the Xinjiang situation,” referring to “lessons” learned from the Tiananmen car explosion (“10-28”) and the Kunming knife incident (“3-01”) (doc 2, p.6).

At the second Xinjiang Central Work Forum the following month, Yu Zhengsheng, then head of the Central Committee Xinjiang Work Co-ordination small group (*zhongyang xinjiang gongzuo xietiao xiaozu* 中央新疆工作协调小组) and chair of CPPCC, repeated that Xinjiang work must focus on this “period of interventionary treatment” (doc 2, p.64). In October 2017, Chen Quanguo, then party chief for Xinjiang, repeated the phrase in the context of “implementing the General Secretary’s targets and following the party’s and nation’s strategy” (doc 6, p.17). This mimicked the orders of Xi himself in 2014 that “those who should be seized, should be seized” (*gai zhuo de zhuo* 该抓的抓) (doc 2, p.9). Chen repeated the order to “round up all those who should be rounded up” (*yingshou jinsou* 应收尽收) in an Xinjiang Party Committee meeting in 2018 (doc 8, p.6-7), already mentioned by the XUAR government in 2017 (doc 3, p.7). These repeated commands were given in the context of showing “absolutely no mercy” and “building a great wall of iron” to create mechanisms of mass mobilisation and surveillance of everyday behaviour in the “People’s war on terror.”


4.1 Mass mobilisation: the “People’s war on terror”

The CCP’s approach to counter-terrorism is explicitly explained in contrast with approaches taken in the UK and USA, for example, by citing London and Manchester to explain that terrorist attacks have increased due the UK’s “human rights over security” (*renquan gaoyu anquan* 人权高于安全) approach (doc 3, p.2-3). Publicly available documents, including statements by the [Embassy of the PRC in the USA](#), regularly criticise the operation of Guantanamo Bay Naval Base as an example of racial discrimination and human rights abuses. However, the party-state’s internal tone shows its approach to security regularly observes these external practices but uses them as lessons to justify the effectiveness and superiority of more invasive internal Chinese governance methods and mass mobilisation.

Xi notes that “after 9-11,” the US federal and state governments realised that “the masses are not simply an opponent but can be used as an important national security resource,” referring to “neighbourhood watch,” “coast guard,” “self-defence,” and “anti-terror hotlines” to report suspicious behaviour (doc 2, p.9-10). He goes on to explain to cadres that “the *People’s* war on terror should be the speciality of our Communist Party, as we are the best at doing organised work,” so “we must widely mobilise the masses of all ethnicities to vigorously co-ordinate anti-terror operations, improve our co-ordinating mechanisms, encourage whistleblowing,” and “those who shelter, harbour or finance violent terrorists must be investigated by law” (doc 2, p.10). Xi considers the US and UK’s governance methods ineffective and asserts the superiority of China’s political system and his methods of targeting signs of alternative thinking and thoughts that could lead to future crimes, rather than criminals and crime. He gives concrete orders for cadres to mobilise the masses and strengthen human surveillance with the party co-ordinating its institutional monitoring mechanisms.

These mechanisms include “becoming family campaign” (*fanghuiju* 访惠聚) and “ten family joint defence groups” (*shihulianfang* 十户联防), which became universally enforced in Xinjiang following these orders. They use the well-known [grid management system](#) to govern neighbourhood districts with “grid crews” (*wangge yuan* 网格员) and a “grid leader” (*wangge zhang* 网格长) who monitor households for

signs of terrorism and extremist ideology. These local teams are linked to village SWAT police, convenience police stations, and the local village party commission through ordered lines of communication. [Chen Quanguo](#), tasked by Xi to maintain “social stability” in Xinjiang, implemented this surveillance system based on experience as Tibet Party chief. This mass human surveillance system is based on his interpretation of Song dynasty military measures, the household registration and self defence system (*baojia* 保甲), and how these ideas about community and moral self-surveillance were implemented in [Fengqiao county, Zhejiang](#), during Mao’s class struggle campaign to identify and educate counter-revolutionary enemies into “new people.” The “*Fengqiao experience*” is based on mobilising residents and local cadres together to enable security issues to be resolved immediately, preventing instability before it occurs and saving government resources. Cadres study this [mass mobilisation](#) and surveillance system and Xi considers its effective implementation his “mass line” (*qunzhong luxian* 群众路线).



A public notification on incidents related to *shibulianfang* in Ürümchi, April 2019, warning residents that ordinary staff and the military are interlinked institutions. Image source: [RFA, 2019](#).

Xi’s 2014 speeches commanded this institutional framework of mass surveillance and preventative security. He deploys ideas from classical Chinese texts linked to party-state theory to assert the superior Chinese-ness of his approach, distinguished from practices deemed Western. He selectively quotes from *the*

*Xunzi*¹⁹ (“the foundation of using troops in war lies in caring about the people”) to claim this means “the fundamental problem in making war lies in uniting the masses in one heart and the strength of anti-terror stability work (*weiwen* 维稳) is the people” (doc 2, p.10). Xi uses the text to distinguish Chinese methods and mobilisation of the masses from ‘western’ approaches to security, including the need to “strengthen the affinity, emotional appeal, and attraction of masses work (*qunzhong gongzuo* 群众工作)” (doc 1, p.25).

Xi’s metaphor of a “[great wall of iron](#)” was used across state media during 2017, referring to “stability work” and “long-term stability.” In his classified speeches, these ideas are fully explained as methods of sealing Xinjiang from inflows and outflows of people and ideas, leaving no space for people described as terrorists: “We must organise and mobilise the masses of all ethnicities to strengthen joint prevention and control (*lianfang liankong* 联防联控),²⁰ mass defence and governance (*qunfang qunzhi* 群防群治),²¹ constructing a great wall of iron, and creating an escape-proof net,²² making violent terrorists become ‘like rats with everyone shouting kill it!’” (doc 2, p.9). Unlike the Cultural Revolution, mass mobilisation is to be strictly organised and co-ordinated by party-state mechanisms. In the section, “we must maintain the special group integration and rely on the masses,” Xi uses Mao Zedong’s logics of the “question of first importance for the revolution” (“who are enemies? who are our friends?”), towards mass mobilisation of society to target Uyghurs:

¹⁹ The *Xunzi* is a classic legalist Confucian text (4th century BCE), which was often criticised due to its emphasis on how government needs to be structured around the reality of violence and limitless selfish human desires, over promoting social peace and individual harmony with the cosmos. It has recently been repopularised by scholars of the “Chinese school of international relations theory”, including Yan Xuetong, who argues for Sinicisation of international relations theory and practice, which is repeated in Xi’s concept of “new type of international relations.”

²⁰ “Joint prevention and control” (*lianfang liankong*) later became synonymous with public health and disease control under the State Council’s “[joint prevention and control mechanism](#).”

²¹ “[Mass defence and governance](#)” (*qunfang qunzhi*) is a nationwide security practice, with publicised training sessions to “prevent incidents” even in “[occupational health](#)” institutes and [mass propaganda posters](#) that explain it is an important principle linking all levels of the party, government, and organisation for the masses to maintain stability.

²² “Escape-proof net” (*Tianluo dimang* 天罗地网) is a fixed phrase, drawn from the “Tales and deeds of the Song Dynasty,” that links to the “two-faced” people problem. It refers to someone who uses flattery but finds themselves in inescapable trouble due to their dishonesty.

“Strike against our common enemies, in a tit for tat struggle, with absolutely no mercy,” “...deepen all sorts of mass defence and mass governance activities, to fight the People’s war on terror and build a great wall of iron, making violent terrorists become ‘like rats with everyone shouting kill it!’ We must strengthen management of the floating population (*liudong renkou* 流动人口), guard the security of key housing communities (*shequ* 社区), work units (*danwei* 单位), and departments” (Doc 1, p.10).

Media coverage disseminated the “rats” phrase attributed to [Xi Jinping](#) following this speech. After the May 14th Ürümchi car explosion, [CCP news](#) for cadres and the mainstream [Chinanews.com](#), reported Guo Shenkun’s (PSB chief and State Council member) same demand in Ürümchi meetings with security personnel and Zhang Chunxian’s (then-regional party secretary) provincial-level meeting of leaders, ordering cadres and the party to structure stability work and surveillance mechanisms to enable society to round on people displaying “signs” of terrorism like rats.

Xi’s orders on “masses work” and showing “absolutely no mercy” in the “People’s war on terror” include integration and co-ordination of every level of the party and the masses to monitor behaviour, with cadres warned regarding failures in implementation and information leaks. The “grassroots party organisation should become impenetrable forces in the struggle” (doc 1, p.24) and the “unceasing strengthening of the cohesion between party and the masses of all ethnicities must prevent ‘the 3 Evils’ from exaggerating incidents” (doc 1, p.32). Xi orders cadres to report on any signs of undesirable thought or behaviour or they will be punished: “All cadres and religious personnel *must* bravely speak out on extremist religious ideology and violent terrorist activities,” “maintain two hard fists over the long-term” in the “struggle against separatism,” and “all levels of cadre, especially leaders, must not only think correctly and talk about correct morals, they must also do this well in their actions” (document 1, article 5, p.34-35).

Xi's attempts to create a centrally co-ordinated and monitored mass surveillance society includes mass detention of Uyghurs and ensuring all cadres are monitored in this work. Xi orders the fulfilment of all “co-ordination,” “targets” and “ideology work” he sets out when he states, “I want to especially emphasise one thing, doing Xinjiang work well is related to the overall situation of the whole nation...and is the business of all the party and the nation” (doc 1, p.26). Xi emphasises that in this struggle, “cadres must be selected and co-ordinated according to the correct standards and rational organisation” (doc 1, p.35), to ensure fulfilment of centrally set targets.

Xi ends the second speech by warning cadres regarding the strict institutional framework of surveillance and punishment they work in: “the regional government and all levels of the party are one fist with shared responsibilities,” and “every region and every department must work according to principles of ‘whoever is in charge bears responsibility’ (*shui zhubuguan shui fuze* 谁主管 谁负责) and management jurisdiction, with labour responsibilities divided, and positions fixed” (doc 2, p.35). The principle of ‘whoever is in charge is responsible’ refers to all policy implementation and monitoring in Xinjiang. The XUAR party committee’s punishment of Wang Yongzhi was a direct response to this responsibility principle and his failures to meet centralised “targets” that order cadres to “round up all those who should be rounded up” (doc 9, p.2 & 8). These institutional mechanisms lock local cadres, security, personnel, and police in positions where they face severe punishments for failing to report any undesirable signs of thought or behaviour. This micro-management approach to security threatens cadres lives and livelihoods, incentivising them to err on the side of zealousness and blindly follow orders to detain people as bureaucratic exercises.

The arbitrary nature of pre-trial detention and threat attributed to Uyghurs is reflected in the “[three types of people](#)” (*sanlei rennyuan* 三类人员) concept, which describes the most dangerous people as those sentenced, those held in pretrial detention for up to 3 years, and those sent to “re-education camps.” “Three types of people” is also used to refer to trainees held at “vocational education and training centres,” for example by the [State Council \(article 2\)](#), as people engaging in

“activities in circumstances that were not serious enough to constitute a crime,” “activities that posed a real danger but did not cause actual harm,” and former prisoners whose “confession, repentance, and willingness to receive training are preconditions for their leniency.” Both versions include people who have not been convicted of any crimes.

The [PRC Supreme People’s Procuratorate](#) 2018 report covers 2014-2017, stating it met Xi Jinping’s “important targets” with a 19.2% increase in prosecutions on the previous five years. The unusually large gap between arrests (4,531,000) and prosecutions (7,173,000), indicates the arbitrary nature of mass detention in the region. Statistics from different regions across the PRC cannot fill the gap. The [XUAR People’s Procuratorate](#) reports note 34,816 prosecutions in 2014, 49,075 in 2015, 41,305 in 2016, and rapid increases to 362,872 in 2017 and 135,546 in 2018, the high periods of mass internment. The report explains the growth in the context of the Tiananmen and Kunming incidents referenced by Xi, despite these involving few people and that the Kunming attackers were immediately killed and included in official casualty figures related to the incident.

The [PRC criminal procedure law](#) (article 78) explains how all detainments in China are approved as arrests by the People’s Procuratorate within 30 days. However, article 79 allows arrests to proceed without approval if there is evidence to prove crimes or if they could “cause harm” to “national security” or “public order.” Article 79 provides limitless arbitrary loopholes for police and security organs to bypass the judiciary. The repeated issuing of arrest warrants in pre-trial detention means these centres are being used alongside camps as semi-permanent detention centres. With Xi and Chen’s orders to “round up” based on vague signs of identity, an enormous growth in arbitrary detainments in mass internment camps, [overflowing prisons](#), and pretrial detention centres has followed. The “three types of people,” therefore are essentially one type of danger and enable the arrest and detention of people without being suspected of crimes.

In an anonymous interview with a released former detainee from a pre-trial detention centre, they explained that when they asked security personnel to release

them from handcuffs as it became clear they posed no danger, they responded, “if we took the cuffs off of you, we would have to put the cuffs on ourselves for negligence of duty.”²³ One released Uyghur detainee described being strapped in a tiger chair and interrogated while held in a pre-trial detention centre to determine guilt of any thought-related crimes. When they attempted to share as much information about themselves as they could to show they were not a criminal, the interrogator warned, “Don’t tell us anything if we don’t ask you. You don’t know what will get you into trouble.”²⁴ These are examples of how Xi’s mass surveillance system operates to ensure total compliance with his orders. Security personnel are aware they will be punished for thought-crimes if they do not punish others, and some even display signs of realisation that the system is irrational. For example, the testimony of former policeman, [Wang Leizhan](#), at the Uyghur Tribunal described a “national policy of seeing Uyghurs automatically as enemies/terrorists” that “fell well below professional policing standards.”

4.2 Local implementation: Testing cadres “stability knowledge”

Cadres and security personnel are instructed by Xi’s broad directives, filtering down from the national to local level through his speeches, their use in teaching political education, and formal instructions on implementation, as demonstrated in section 2. Two new key local government documents from a county-level administration in northern Xinjiang have been obtained for this report, which illustrate this process. These provide confirmation and further details on the mass detention practices and institutional mechanisms described above. They offer detailed evidence of how local government receives central party commands and pressures cadres and security personnel in their daily work.²⁵ These implementation methods in a northern county in Xinjiang show how mass detention policies, including the related “[southward development plan](#),” link to broader patterns of

²³ *Anonymous* interview with released Uyghur detainee (March 2022).

²⁴ *Anonymous* interview with released Uyghur detainee (February 2022).

²⁵ These documents have been authenticated by [Dr Hannah Theaker](#), whose support was requested due to their specific expertise in Chinese documents and the subject area of Islam in Chinese politics and history (See: Appendix - Authentication of documents). The documents also use standardised names of policies and practices described throughout this report. The specific locality name cannot be revealed to protect the safety of the source.

mass detention and monitoring mechanisms, focusing on Uyghurs from the south and those travelling to Kazakhstan from the north.

附件

政法综治维稳知识 100 题

1、新疆反恐维稳“三期叠加”的特殊形势是指哪三期？

答：暴力恐怖活动活跃期、反分裂斗争激烈期、干预治疗的阵痛期。

2、自治区反恐维稳工作“三个四句话”是？

答：一是围绕总目标、查找薄弱点、案件汲教训、工作抓落实；二是春季防反弹、夏季抓成效、秋季抓检验、冬季打基础；三是破团伙、打“三非”、强基础、严管理。

3、张春贤书记指出的北疆地区三大风险点是什么？

答：一是暴恐分子南打北逃，流窜北疆治理薄弱地区，伺机实施暴恐活动；二是北疆地区边境线长，境内外居民联系交往多，暴恐分子潜入潜出、内外勾连有增多趋势；三是暴恐分子对重要基础设施、旅游景点进行恐怖袭击的可能性增大。

County-level cadre training manual, “100 questions on political-legal comprehensive social stability.”

The first document is a cadre study text of policy implementation in standard Q&A format, titled “100 questions on political-legal comprehensive social stability knowledge” (*zhengfa zongzhi weimen zhishi 100ti* 政法综治维稳知识 100 题). The cover letter from the county-level, explains this “urgent telegram” (*teti* 特提) is a “notification (*tongzhi* 通知) on the ‘knowledge test’ of comprehensive political and legal governance and stability maintenance,” sent to all townships, towns, neighbourhood, and city-level departments, signed on 2nd August 2016 by a county-level stability leading group office (*weibu wending gongzuo lingdao xiaozu bangongshi* 维护稳定工作领导小组办公室) and comprehensive governance party committee office (*shehui zhi'an zhili weiyuanhui bangongshi* 社会治安治理委员会办公室). The cover letter states that the test materials are part of annual tests on comprehensive government work to be earnestly studied by all leading cadres at prefecture, town, neighbourhood, and city levels in all work units for “clean governance education” (*lianzheng xuexi jiaoyu* 廉政学习教育).

The test was issued in 2016 prior to the high-period of mass detention in summer 2017 and functions to ensure cadres implement central commands to monitor for signs of extremism and separatism amongst the population. The test format is a standard means of policy implementation study and cadre control in the region, focusing on ideological principles (e.g., 3 Evils, separatism, extremism, national security, etc) and how they relate to their daily work and policy implementation pertaining to governance and stability (*weiwen gongzuo, fanghuiju*, etc). The test includes detailed instructions on how to identify “early warning” (*yujing* 预警) threats, respond to incidents, and the mechanisms, number of staff on call, and reaction times expected, at three levels (county, township, and departments) (p.5-6).

The second document is a later speech (May 20th, 2018) following the work described in the test, given by a Prefectural Party Secretary at the same county-level administration’s work symposium (*zuotanhui* 座谈会). It is an official transcription of a voice recording.²⁶ Most of the speech discusses the achieved targets over the high period of internment, referring to prior orders from the test, relatively successful policy implementation in the county, and how Xi Jinping himself is satisfied with their work and functioning of the institutional mechanisms to fulfil his orders.

The documents are not marked as confidential but are the types and formats of documents disseminated for private cadre study sessions in Xinjiang. Public records show prefectural party secretaries in northern Xinjiang did visit county-level administrations during this period to review their work and gave the same orders found in the speech, for example to strictly follow Xi Jinping’s demands of “[creating a new situation in six aspects](#)” (*kaichuang liuge fangmian xinjunian* 廉开创六个方面新局面): 1. focusing on overall targets to “seize stability,” including community management and stability work, 2. implementing Xi’s “new development thinking,” 3. teaching “fusion” (*jiaorong* 交融) from nursery age, 4.

²⁶ It is marked, “taken from voice recording, not yet approved by the speaker” (*genju luyin zhengli, weijing benren tongyi* 根据录音整理未经本人同意). Speeches by Chinese officials are edited and approved before being circulated. Therefore, this should be read as a private speech for leaders, cadres, and security personnel, with no attempt to appeal to public audiences or conceal private information.

implementing Xi's religious management policies, 5. building a prosperous middle-class society, and 6. "clean governance," including testing cadre's ideology and coordinating policy monitoring mechanisms. Together these documents illustrate how the party-state operates in Xinjiang with implementation of Xi's orders from the centre managed and monitored through mechanisms of human surveillance, which place the Uyghur and Kazakh population under permanent suspicion and cadres in the position of following orders zealously or to expect punishment.

The cadres' stability test explains many concepts from publicly available documents and the mechanisms of governance observed and analysed above. The "three periods of overlay" (*sanqi diejia* 三期叠加), emphasised by party leaders, including the [2018 XUAR work report](#), are described in the answer to the first question pertaining to Xinjiang's "anti-terror stability" work (*fankong weinwen* 反恐维稳): "violent terrorist activities leap period, intensification of anti-separatism struggle period, and the painful period of interventionary treatment." The second question uses a lesser known phrase, asking "what are the '3 4-clause sentences' (*sange sijuhua* 三个四句话) of the XUAR government's anti-terror stability work?" The answer being:

"Number 1 is to revolve round party targets, find weak-spots (*chazhao boruodian* 查找薄弱点), and take lessons from incidents. The second is, in spring, prevent rebounds, in summer seize results, in autumn seize inspections, and in winter, strike the foundation. The third is smash gangs and cliques (*tuanhuo* 团伙), strike the foundation of the '[three illegals](#)' (*san fei* 三非),²⁷ and strengthen our foundation with severe management" (p.3).

²⁷ Question 57 (p.15-17) explains that *sanfei* are "illegal religious activities, propaganda materials, and broadcasts," listing the most obvious "20 signs" for cadres to identify them, including uncertified religious activities and prayer (p.3, 7 and 9), people who follow religion from outside the local area (p.4-5), [Nikah marriage rites](#) (p.8), uncertified use of statistical materials (p.14), uncertified donations (p.17), activities related to foreign (*wailai*) religion (p.19), and uncertified renovation of religious venues (p.20), following the same wording laid out in the "Xinjiang papers" document 10. In addition to the 20 signs, the arbitrarily worded "any other activities" that violate law, regulations, or policy is included (p.21).

The second ‘4-clause’ sentence repeats the language “seize” (*zhuā* 抓) used by Xi during this period as precursor to the 2017 “round up” order. The summary of implementation patterns explains cadre’s work focus has been outlined by the XUAR government and ordered by Xi to build towards the summer 2017 mass internment period (“seize results”), after cadres prepare to “prevent rebounds” in spring 2017. Rebounds are expected in the form of resistance to current “thorough population search” (*renkou mopai* 人口摸排) work to survey and catalogue the population, outlined in question 72, followed by “mobilisation and deployment” (April 1st-April 20th), “deployment and investigation” (April 21st- December 15th), and “summarising inspections period” (December 16th-February 28th, 2017) (question 72, p.20). These seasonal patterns are often used to describe annual stability work routines across the PRC but these are the most specific dates available.

These seasonal patterns appear in numerous sources, including the 2015 [XUAR Party political legal \(*zhengfa*\) committee](#) meetings to maintain central party policy measures, with building “seizure teams” (*zhuā duiwu* 抓队伍) to round people up the key priority. A 2015 [China Daily](#) report uses the reference with regard to the ‘becoming family’ campaign in Kezhou village (Kizilsu Kyrgyz autonomous prefecture), with many [textbooks](#) from the area already available and documented [protests against headscarf bans](#) in 2013. This seasonal work pattern was also explained in the [Korla City 2015 work report](#) and a standard notification on “[required knowledge and skills](#)” for stability work in 2019.



克州党委领导检查指导驻村工作

Kezhou Party leadership inspects and guides village work. Source: [Xinjiang Documentation Project](#).

In 2014 and 2015, Zhang Chunxian, Xinjiang party secretary at the time gave a series of speeches for all [regional XUAR government representatives](#) and stability work meetings in [Shache county](#), with the [State Council](#) announcing these investigations and further meetings in southern Xinjiang. These meetings stressed the need to meet party targets, “seize” “de-extremification” work, and gave instructions on deepening work to “find weak-spots,” as mentioned in the cadre stability test, including the “work of paying attention to people born in the 1980s and ‘90s.”²⁸ The party’s work to “severely manage” and strike the foundation of the “three illegals” was widely disseminated by the [People’s Daily](#) in 2015 referring to the “painful period of interventionary treatment,” explained at the second Xinjiang central work forum, [media reports](#) on Xinjiang’s local cadres who were now “[speaking out with swords](#)” after learning painful lessons, and a [2021 work report](#) on “severely managing” the “becoming family” campaign in Uyghur homes.

Most cadre work outlined in the county-level test obtained for this report focuses on identifying signs of separatist and extremist thought and behaviour that affect “national security” and “social order”, including how to respond through the institutional mechanisms outlined by the central party-state. The targets of regional “population search” work use a strict “one-person-one-file points management system as the foundation,” with cadres told that when conducting thorough searches, “villages do not miss households, households do not miss people, people do not miss items, and wrong items must be corrected” (p.20).²⁹ These instructions regarding the need to investigate and record all persons and items, to ensure no escape for anything deemed incorrect, were explained in 2016 meetings on special “population search” work by the head of the [12th Division of the Bingtuan](#) in Ürümchi, including all subdivisions and the PAP, and in a meeting of the [Bingtuan 4th Division](#) in Ghulja during the same period. The “one-person-one-file”

²⁸ Xi notes, “In the terrorist incidents of the last two years, many participants are young rural people born in the 1980s and ‘90s” (doc 1, p.12). The Xinjiang Victims’ Database records being born in the 1980s and 90s as explanations given to many detainees in pre-trial detention centres.

²⁹ *Lou* (漏) translates as “weak point” in military defence or “to leak” or be missed from the clutches of a net, relating to the “escape-proof net” of surveillance described in the previous section.

management system was also stressed in [Wushi \(Uqturpan\) county](#) (Aksu) cadre notifications in 2018.³⁰

“De-extremification” work is described as concentrating on “five types of people”: imams, 2-faced people, 2-faced cadres, people participating in or funding terrorism, and people who have been abroad (*jingwai huiliu ren yuan* 境外回流人员) (p.15). The “district’s 3 types of “focus people” (*zhongdian ren yuan* 重点人员) to “severely guard against” (*fangfan* 防范) are identified as Xinjiang’s “floating population,” “local focus people,” and “people returning from abroad, especially residents of Kazakhstan” (p.23). The text explains that former Xinjiang Party Secretary, Zhang Chunxian, identified the northern “big risks” as terrorists from southern Xinjiang escaping to and from the region and the length of the northern border (p.3).

Cadres are instructed to “look out for” signs of separatist and extremist religious thought, with “activities of ethnic separatist forces” described as “the most important risk influencing stability in Xinjiang” (p.15). There are “5 grades” of “focus people affecting stability,” with the most serious types 1 and 2 (“those committing actual harmful activities” and those “tending towards harmful activities”), to be dealt with by county-level security organs (p.6). The township-level comprehensive governance centre (*zongzhi gongzuo zhongxin* 综治工作中心) must use measures to deal with types 3-5 (those displaying “rigid thought” (*guding sixiang* 固定思想), “unstable thought or feelings,” and “ordinary (*yiban* 一般) focus people”) (p.6).

The text explains that the XUAR government determined “5 types of opponents” to “strike hard” against: those who “carry terrorist and extremist religious ideology sound and video,” “transmit it online,” “use oral methods to transmit extremist religious thought, call for ‘holy war,’ as well as religious extremists,” those who “use social contradictions to incite ethnic hatred or ethnic antagonisms,” “transmitters of religious extremism, such as Imams, people released from prison, and *other* related persons” (p.8). The “key signs of extremist religious behaviour,” include “calling for religious supremacy,” “disobeying normal customs,” and

³⁰ Also, see: <http://www.zuzhirenshi.com/showinfo/b3fdfe84-792b-4c60-ac62-77d98e025ba0>.

“interfering with the operation of political administration,” “marriage,” and “birth control policies” (p.19). Identifying these people is the “responsibility” of the township, town and street-level comprehensive governance teams, while “transformation education work” (*jiaoyu zhuanhua gongzuo* 教育转化工作) is the responsibility of the village and community (*shequ*) comprehensive governance workstations” (p.23). This vast number of numerical rules are unlikely to be memorised by all cadres and mentions of “any other” in relation to prohibited activities or ideas (p.17) and ordinary behaviours and “close relationships” (p.22-23), reflect the arbitrariness of mass detention and incentivisation of zealotry. Cadres and the security services are pressured to look for signs of cultural difference when rounding people up, alongside targeting religious figures and policing genuine crimes.

The “three illegals” (p.15-17) clearly designates religious figures as most dangerous (grades 1 and 2) but goes further to list people who have “been abroad,” “use statistical materials,” or could be construed as displaying separatist or “rigid *thought*.” The “5 keys,” another numerical guide to cadre and security work, includes how “thought methods must be used to resolve thought problems,” and “cultural methods should be used to resolve cultural problems” (p.19). The “ten types of focus people determined by the XUAR government”³¹ include “signs of *feelings* of social dissatisfaction” and “other types of people who might form harm to national security and social stability” (p.22). The regional targets of the “3 must-prevents” (*sange jianjue fangzhi* 三个坚决防止), include “infiltration of extremist religious ideology” (q.4, p.3), which can refer to any religious materials not certified by the party-state.

Cadres and security personnel are given unrealistic amounts of rules to memorise and implement. Given the risks to their own lives related to “violations of discipline,” they are disincentivised by central orders from thinking about implementation and incentivised to zealously round people up during their investigations. When conducting in-person investigations of the “3 types of focus people” (floating population, local focus people, and people who have returned

³¹ These precede and are more comprehensive than the “3 types” identified by the district (p.23).

from abroad), cadres and security personnel are ordered to apply the “4-musts” (*sige bixu*): enter their buildings, check everyone present face-to-face, check all goods, and the origins of any goods that may appear suspicious (q.76, p.21).

Cadres and the security services are given a range of questions, the “5 must-asks” (*wubi wen* 五必问), and essential topics to discuss, “the 6 must chats” (*liubi liao* 六必聊), when monitoring the everyday thought of Uyghur households. The topics are not designed to detect criminals but for the “becoming family” campaign under strict leadership of the township-level party and government, in which cadres visit and live in *all* Uyghur and Kazakh homes to assess their perceived threat level (q.9, p.4). The “5 must-asks” are “to understand and grasp the thinking and behaviour of the rural masses” (p.4). They ask, “are you or any close associates planning to emigrate to Kazakhstan? If so, for what reason?”, “do they have any suggestions regarding management of religious affairs,” “what is their knowledge of the current stability work? What are their views on the development of strike hard? What have they done themselves?”, “as a normal person, how have they themselves advocated that ‘ethnic unity starts with me?’” and asking how they view the township party committee, village party cadres, and convenience stations (q. 10, p.4).

Cadres and armed security personnel ask ordinary people these questions in their homes under no suspicion of breaking the law to assess signs of difference and feelings of dissatisfaction with party-state policy and its command structure. These practices are more invasive than bureaucratic authoritarian state control methods to locate and eliminate material threats to state authority and are designed to root out signs of unhappiness amongst specifically targeted ethnic communities. The “six must-chats” include “talking face-to-face and knee-to-knee to understand the family’s basic situation” (1), “advocating that “there is no person or business unrelated to stability” (2), “advocating that ethnic unity comes from building a good atmosphere, propagating and promoting the correct energy” (3), “talking about the party’s good policy” and “leading the masses to greater warmth and love for the motherland” (4) (q.11, p.4-5).

As ordered in Xi's 2014 speeches, the document explains how the masses are to be mobilised as a core element of the "people's war on terror." "Voluntary defence" (*zishen fanfang* 自身反方) describes how all citizens must participate in political activities, including how "grassroots organisations must provide and report information on social governance and clues on illegal crime" (q.49, p.14). The "function of all religious personnel must be revealed as fighting distortions of extremist ideology," (q.66, p.18), as explained by Xi in 2014 that "Xinjiang's ethnic minority believers must do good religious work" as the "function of religious believers is to advance religion into compatibility with socio-economic development" (doc 1, p.18). The policy of "[cultural covering](#)" (*wenhua duichong* 文化对冲) to use "advanced culture" to eliminate extremism and "ignorant and backward culture," reflects broader centralised Sinicisation policy, including "mass education" and holding "activities reflecting colourful customs and traditions" (q.65, p.18), as designated by the party-state in its "[intangible heritage](#)" protection system.

The institutional "management" system to find "focus people" and check for signs of undesirable ideology in the county-level documents connect human surveillance and co-ordinated institutions, including the "mechanisms of '5 offices, one body' (*wuweiyiti* 五位一体)." Through direct lines of communication, this links the party office, village party commission secretary, convenience station chief, *fanghuiju* team, and village police office, with every township and village having two levels of cadre and every cadre connecting two "ten family heads" (*shihu zhang* 十户长) and 10-20 village households (question 8, p.4).

The principle of "whoever is in charge is responsible" and "positions fixed" from Xi's speeches (doc 2, p.35) is applied by interlinking the party, security services, and households in one system, with everyone responsible. The co-ordination system on "resolving disputes" places the party in command, with "jurisdiction management" and "whoever is in charge is responsible" principles applied. Monthly "comprehensive governance" meetings are held at county-level and twice a month at township-level (p.24). The management system to assess threats posed by the floating population includes these mechanisms (p.19-20). Security personnel

are ordered by the PSB to enter all information on labour, business, and renting property, into a centrally administered mobile phone app, with data sent to the local police station (*paichusuo* 派出所) (p.21-22). This includes the “369 time limit work method,” in which a community cadre must be informed within three hours of any arrival or departure of new persons, meet them face-to-face within six hours to “collect information,” and register their “investigation” online within nine hours (q.70, p.24).³² Orders to record cases include regional regulations on people who perform “coverups,” such as hiding terrorist propaganda, deleting “terrorist recordings” or avoiding household registration, and the “eyewitness integration” investigation system to monitor all arrivals into the jurisdiction by road, plane, or train (q.81 & 82, p.23).

Cadres, security personnel, and households assigned through the “ten family” system, and their close associates, will be punished if they do not report and record issues of thought or emotions potentially related to religion or ethnicity that they encounter, including the arbitrary “*other* issues assessed as affecting social stability” (p.25). Political and legal organs (*zhengfa jiguan* 政法机关) “must take responsibility” and are in charge of “resolving disputes” at the local level (p.24) but embedded in networks of human surveillance (*fanghuiju*), household self-monitoring (*shibu lianfang*), and reporting mechanisms (*wuweiyiti*) with the party in command.

When discovering “heretical” propaganda in-person, cadres must immediately contact the local police and village party committee (q.91, p.25-26). If encountering propaganda online, they “voluntarily must not listen, look, speak, or propagate,” including ending any conversations or SMS communications (q.93, p.26), that includes conversations with friends or family. Monetary fines are given to all levels of these mechanisms and government, including work units (q.40, p.12), while incentives to report are offered in monetary rewards for “preventing activities” that could damage national or societal security within a year (q.96, p.26-27). XUAR regulations stipulate between 200,000 and 5 million RMB for discovery of actions or “plans” to commit any “terrorist” acts (q.100, p.28). This balance of reward and

³² The “369” rule is referenced by [Human Rights Watch](#) and in [Gulbahar Haiitiwaji](#)’s first-hand account of her extra-legal detention, [How I survived a Chinese re-education camp](#).

punishment, alongside extensive rules and regulations related to monitor behaviour and thought demands zealousness and disincentivises caution when cadres and security personnel “round up all those who should be rounded up,” placing all households under surveillance (*fanghuiju*) and self-surveillance (*shibu lianfang*).

The private speech from the Prefectural Party Secretary given at this county’s work symposium in May 2018, follows the four season plan outlined above, and refers to many of the policies and practices analysed above, including stability work (p.7), the detention camp system (“4+2 work” and *liangsuo yizhongxin* 两所一中心) (p.17), security around pre-trial detention centres (p.16-17), Xi’s policies of religious management (*zongjiao guanli* 宗教管理) (p.28-29), and monitoring the population’s “mood changes” (*qingxu bianhua* 情绪变化) and “thought changes” (*sixiang bianhua* 思想变化), particularly those from southern Xinjiang (p.18).

The commentary in the speech is structured around recognising Xi’s strategic policy drives (*zhibijiang fanglue* 致疆方略) (p.36) and implementation of his planning demands (*jihua yaoqiu* 计划要求) (p.10). The focus of the speech is social stability and long-term stability targets (*mubiao* 目标), which have been relatively successfully met, including XUAR regulations demanding convenience police stations (*jingwuzhan* 警务站) every 300 metres (p.7), three-minute reaction times to any incidents (p.10), and ‘becoming family’ visits to eat together and implement social control (*shehuimian guankong* 社会面管控) (p.18). The party secretary reports Xi’s personal satisfaction with the county’s successful implementation (p.2-4), including orders to “round up all those who should be rounded up” (p.16).

The prefectural party secretary’s speech opens with critical reminders that during his last visit in March 2017, “many charges and criticisms were received,” and “help had been plentiful” but the county’s “work was generally at its twilight” and still didn’t fully reflect the “governance strategy for Xinjiang,” set by the “central party-state with Xi Jinping as its core” (p.1). Since then, “from protecting social stability to social control of the masses work to ethnic unity to economic development, everyone has been extremely attentive, and the tight schedule of arranging these methods has been extremely effective...I express my gratitude to

all comrades” (p.2). However, “party people keep going,” so “on one hand, I am here to express thanks, but on the other, to progress” the demands of “creating the ‘new situation in six aspects’ given by General Secretary Xi” (p.5)³³: “you must make the sacrifices that must be made, and devote what must be devoted, and there is nothing else to say about this,”³⁴ because these “fit the reality of (the county’s) work,” and focused targets on stability, development, and religious policy implementation.

A fiery speech follows, ordering cadres to continue their work and the struggle, which they “cannot give up” (p.18). It recounts mistakes and criticisms, including building housing near a pre-trial detention centre (“wrong environment”) (p.16). The party secretary reminds cadres of strict orders to implement policies and Xi’s “social stability targets” without question and “without thinking about other demands”(*meiyou zai xiang biede yaoqiu* 没有再想别的要求) (p.14), because even though the “round up all those who should be rounded up work has no problems,” “there are many hidden dangers” (*yin huan* 隐患) (p.16). Hidden dangers include the floating population from southern Xinjiang, where they “participate and collude in incidents, so they are being hit harder and harder until they cannot bear it,” and “they reveal themselves” (p.18). Working with southern Xinjiang’s cadres to monitor their “mood changes” and “thinking changes” is key to “improving detection processes”, and even if “they are simple minded, if they have a heart, they will not be shocked” (p.18), when questioned by armed security personnel and “severely managed” by cadres.

The speech is one of the most explicit forms of evidence available on cadres’ daily work and instructions given on mass detention. It corresponds closely to evidence

³³ These six demands for the “new situation,” analysed above (p.38-39), are explained as being given during Xi’s visit, drawing from the “experience” and “good work” conducted and are not “picking small faults,” therefore must be followed (p.4). The contents of these demands as applied to Xinjiang is addressed throughout the speech, and studied by cadres across Xinjiang, including [Altay City](#), [Habahe county](#), and [Qinghe county](#). They are given in slightly different form to other borderland regions, such as Guangxi and [Heli, Tibet](#), but always refer to Xi’s structuring of the party-state’s command system and monitoring mechanisms.

³⁴ *Ni gai xisheng de xisheng, gai fengxian de fengxian, zhe meiyou shenme shuode* (你该牺牲的牺牲，该奉献的奉献，这没有什么说的).

in the “Xinjiang papers,” including Xi’s 2014 commands, the punishments for leading cadres’ failures to implement those commands, and specific focus on striking hard given during Xi’s “informal discussion” with cadres in southern Xinjiang (doc 1, p.27-36). This speech considers failures in Xinjiang policy prior to mass detention, stressing that cadres are now under pressure to strike harder. Xi already warned that southern Xinjiang is now entering a “crux period” (document 1, p.28), with cadres ordered to “use both fists to strike hard, deep, and fast” (doc 1, p.29). Like the 2016 and 2018 county-level documents analysed, Xi ordered cadres to strengthen stability work in remote areas, to “bravely step into battle and not be afraid to *sacrifice*” (doc 1, p.30), “strengthen the management of religious affairs” (doc 1, p.33) and that they “*must* bravely speak out” when encountering potential behavioural signs that could lead to instability (doc 1, p.34).

Xi ordered cadres to “effectively resolve cross-infection problems (*jiaocha ganran wenti* 交叉感染问题) and not permit areas with prisoners in re-education to engage in serial communication, with the poisoning becoming deeper, as they engage in greater problems after release” (doc 1, p.30). A “major cause” for increased violence in the region is considered, “the dense religious atmosphere providing soil and climate,” with Xi admonishing cadres because “the issue of religious figures interfering with worldly life” “has not emerged suddenly” (doc 1, p.33). Xi emphasised the need to effectively train and select cadres from this juncture onwards and according to his “correct standards,” including a “system of reward and protection to benefit Han cadres,” encouraging them and “their children” to “take root in Xinjiang and build southern Xinjiang,” as “the backbone in southern Xinjiang’s long-term rooted struggle” and to “be the pillar!” (doc 1, p.35).

The rewards offered to Han from other parts of China to settle in the region contrast against suspicion towards local non-Han, exemplified by the “the need to increase training levels of ethnic minority cadres” and strengthen their “loyalty to the party,” “particularly in Kashgar, Hotan, and areas like that with Uyghur population ratios that go up to 90%, even 95%” (doc 1, p.35). Xi Jinping commands and strictly monitors implementation of Xinjiang policy and daily governance, including mass detention, based on distinction between safe, loyal

Han and suspect, dangerous Uyghurs. By 2018 he was relatively satisfied that these commands were being implemented in northern Xinjiang, but much work was to be done in the south due to the greater number of Uyghurs.

4.3 Dispersing communities: “Settling the frontier” and “population optimisation”

According to the Uyghur Tribunal’s [judgement](#), the PRC’s birth control policies in Xinjiang contravene article 2(d) of the [UN genocide convention](#) (“imposing measures to prevent births within the group”). [Adrian Zenz](#) has noted how the “Xinjiang papers,” including Xi’s 2014 speeches and instructions for the [Bingtuan](#) to address “severe imbalances in the structure of the ethnic population” in southern Xinjiang, show that plans to “optimise the population” (*youbua renkou* 优化人口) are central party-state commands.

“Population optimisation” includes moving more Han into the region. The CCP Central Committee issued specific orders in December 2017 to transfer at least 300,000 Han settlers to southern Xinjiang by 2022 towards “population optimisation” and “population security” (doc 7, p.9). Xi explains, Xinjiang’s “population proportion and population security are important foundations for long-term peace and stability” (doc 1, p.40). Xi restated the Bingtuan paramilitary group’s historic “mission” of “settling the frontier” (*tunken shubian* 屯垦戍边) at [2014](#) and [2020](#) Xinjiang central work meetings, and for it to be used as “transit point for optimising the population” in the “[southward development plan](#)” (doc 1, p.40). Population proportion is treated as a security problem in the context that “southern Xinjiang is China’s forward position in fighting terrorism, infiltration, and separatism,” and Kashgar is an “important strategic shield” (doc 1, p.27).

[Dispersing Uyghurs](#) and other Turkic-speaking Muslim communities across China for education and employment is a widely stated method towards “population optimisation” in official documents. Xi considers districts with high proportions of Uyghurs as unwelcoming and a national security problem that must be resolved as stated in his 2014 speeches on the disconnect between government and the masses,

and why cadres are scared to conduct their work: “southern Xinjiang’s population is at least 90% Uyghur, and if you can’t connect the top to the bottom, this is dangerous. You must take all measures to mingle and form fusion relationships like fish and water, milk and water” (doc 1, p.23-24). In 2014, Yu Zhengsheng and [Zhang Chunxian](#) repeated Xi’s orders in meetings about stability targets, stating that the “population structure is monolithic” and contributes to the “distorted religious atmosphere” (doc 2, p.67), which Xi considers a security threat.


Xi considers security, development, and everyday identity entirely intertwined, relating “concentrations of ethnic minority populations” (*shaoshu minzu renkou jizhong* 少数民族人口集中), alongside long borders and vast deserts, to “development turbulence, complicated religion problems, and stability” (doc 1, p.12-13). The identification of concentrated Uyghur populations as security threats connects to problems of cadres being unwilling or not daring to monitor religious thought and the subsequent intensification of religious management in 2018 (doc 10, p.3), and why religious venues (p.5-6) and businesses (p.9-10) focused on single ethnic groups are forbidden. The assumption also ties to the “fusion problem” explained in the county-level documents analysed in the previous section, which explain that they must avoid problems of “other counties” with apartment blocks occupied by single ethnic groups (county doc 2, p.28).

The solution to “problems” of “concentrations of ethnic minority populations” by dispersing communities is reflected in newly obtained police documents, which list the mass detentions of over 10,000 people in southern Xinjiang. These leaked internal police documents from the Public Security Bureau (PSB) of Konasheher county (*Shufu xian* 疏附县) in Kashgar Prefecture provide new evidence regarding the scale and nature of ethnic targeting in the region.³⁵ They demonstrate how security organs targeted specific villages, block by block, following the “population

³⁵ These lists have been authenticated by Gene Bunin of the [Xinjiang Victims’ Database](#) and the journalists who have reported on them. In list 1, 17,000 of 18,000 ID numbers already appear in other sources, 1,499 people already appear on the XVD, the [police tags](#) applied in the known cases are consistent and would require significant insider knowledge to construct, and numerous individual cases match details of non-public knowledge given in interviews. Regarding list 2 (*Konasheher*), 3,500 of 10,000 ID numbers appear in other sources, 61 people are listed on the XVD (see: Appendix: People). The same details on police tags and individual cases apply.

search” (*renkou mopai*) period, sending Uyghurs to pre-trial detention centres before being dispersed to prisons across the region without evidence of legal process.³⁶

With further analysis, these lists will provide important background to the longer-term targeting of Uyghurs and evolution of policy with the first list’s metadata suggesting a 2015 construction and no detentions listed beyond August 2015. It lists detention of 18,283 people with 326 tagged as involved in “7-5,” the July 2009 violence. The “Konasheher list,” analysed in some detail here, reveals current policy operations in Xinjiang and was constructed around late 2017 to early 2018, the high period of mass detention, with no newly constructed prisons listed (e.g., Dabancheng, Shawan, etc) and all cases with established detention dates around late 2017 (see: Appendix - People). These dates also correspond with the seasonal work patterns analysed in section 4.2 and follow the immediately prior “population search” period. It lists 10,362 people detained from a county of 280,000, according to 2019 statistics (2002 census: 360,000, 2010 census: 310,605, or 233,200 accounting for transfer of township administrative units).



Shufu county (red) in Kashgar Prefecture (Yellow). Image source: Wikipedia.

Konasheher (Shufu county) is adjacent to Kashgar city and Shule county, with a majority Uyghur population,³⁷ all of which were described as centres of terrorism and separatism under Xi and Hu Jintao. This rural county was the home of Ismail Tiliwaldi (XUAR government head, 2003-2007) and its economy is primarily

³⁶ See: Appendix – Targeted townships and villages in Shufu County.

³⁷ 2015 Stats ([Statistics Bureau of XUAR](#)): 277,877 Total (271,556 Uyghur, 5,406 Han).

agricultural. Xi Jinping visited the county on April 28, 2014, during his inspection tour, reported by Xinhua and Ministry of Agriculture (*links now removed*). In 2013, [Bloomberg](#) reported a typical incident of violence in the county. Fights between local population and cadres during post-2012 “stability work” tours were common, and in this case spiralled into more serious violence with a group attacking police with knives and 14 Uyghurs killed, subsequently described as “terrorists” by official media. In August 2020, [Radio Free Asia](#) reported that local authorities restricted all Islamic ‘Nikah’ wedding rites, citing dangers to “stability.”

新疆维吾尔自治区喀什地区疏附县塔什米力克乡12村1组	利用极端主义破坏法律实施罪	5年	新源监狱
新疆疏附县托克拉克镇尤喀尔克曼干村6组001号	寻衅滋事罪	7年	喀什监狱
新疆疏附县塔什米力克乡热孜喀村5组049号	聚众扰乱社会秩序罪	6年	库尔勒高度戒备监狱
新疆疏附县站墩乡英力克村3组052号	宣扬恐怖主义，极端主义罪、煽动实施恐怖活动罪	15年	吐鲁番监狱
新疆疏附县塔什米力克乡热孜喀村4组62号	宣扬恐怖主义，极端主义罪、聚众扰乱社会秩序罪	20年	第一监狱
新疆疏附县兰干镇克孜力古力村6组055号	利用极端主义破坏法律实施罪、寻衅滋事罪	15年11个月	吐鲁番监狱
新疆疏附县乌帕尔镇库克其村13组4号	寻衅滋事罪	10年	兵团且末监狱
新疆疏附县兰干镇布阿纳木村7组059号	宣扬恐怖主义，极端主义罪、煽动实施恐怖活动罪、聚众扰乱社会秩序罪	15年	第一监狱
新疆维吾尔自治区喀什地区疏附县乌帕尔镇14村5组	聚众扰乱社会秩序罪、寻衅滋事罪	9年	吐鲁番监狱
新疆疏附县站墩乡亚西拉村3组36号	宣扬恐怖主义，极端主义罪、聚众扰乱社会秩序罪	20年	第一监狱
新疆疏附县木什乡英奇斯坦布依村2组067号	聚众扰乱社会秩序罪	7年	新源监狱
新疆维吾尔自治区喀什地区疏附县托克拉克镇尤喀尔克曼干村5组025	寻衅滋事罪	10年	阿克苏监狱
新疆疏附县托克拉克镇阿亚格曼干村10组007号	寻衅滋事罪、聚众扰乱社会秩序	16年11个月	第一监狱
新疆疏附县木什乡艾斯力木什村9组060号	宣扬恐怖主义，极端主义罪、煽动实施恐怖活动罪	7年	于田监狱
新疆疏附县乌帕尔镇双开提村5组7号	宣扬恐怖主义，极端主义罪、寻衅滋事罪	7年	昌吉监狱
新疆疏附县沙依巴格乡肖尔村1组022号	聚众扰乱社会秩序罪	7年	巴音郭楞监狱
新疆疏附县乌帕尔镇库木巴格村11组71号	聚众扰乱社会秩序罪	7年	昌吉监狱
新疆维吾尔自治区喀什地区疏附县乌帕尔镇16村1组66号	宣扬恐怖主义，极端主义罪、煽动实施恐怖活动罪	6年	沙雅监狱
新疆维吾尔自治区喀什地区疏附县站墩乡6村4组	宣扬恐怖主义，极端主义罪、煽动实施恐怖活动罪	5年	克孜勒苏监狱
新疆疏附县铁日木乡尤喀日克铁力木村1组62号	利用极端主义破坏法律实施罪、聚众扰乱社会秩序罪	10年11个月	第一监狱
新疆疏附县木什乡艾斯力木什村8组041号	聚众扰乱社会秩序罪	7年	昌吉监狱
新疆疏附县站墩乡林场2组025号	聚众扰乱社会秩序罪	6年	兵团塔门监狱
新疆疏附县铁日木乡尤喀日克铁力木村3组082号	聚众扰乱社会秩序罪	7年	喀什监狱

Sample screenshot of the “Konasheher list” with names and ID numbers removed.

Most “crimes” (*zuiming* 罪名) listed are broadly defined, such as “mass disruption” (5,601 detentions), which can include protest, “[picking quarrels](#)” (3,145) which includes small scale fights or simple arguments, and “advocating (terrorism / extremism)” (2,066), which is not a violent crime. The high number of social “disruption” and “advocating” charges in the list follows from the orders analysed to “round up all those who should be rounded up,” after the intensive “population search” period and the subsequent “rebounds” expected. There are few obvious patterns in the broad charges that determine the sentence lengths, except that the average sentence for “preparing *violent* terrorist activities” is 3.4 years longer than the broader and presumably ideology-focused “preparing terrorist activities.” However, it is noteworthy that the average sentences for “advocating” and “picking quarrels” cases are longer than participating in a terrorist organisation, and that there are no clearly listed crimes of committing physical violence against

persons. There are relatively few cases of “terrorist activities,” with only 299 in total if we add the above two charges to 66 of participating in organisations. This targeting of “advocating” and misbehaviour fits scholars’ understanding of arbitrary mass detention of Uyghurs that does not reflect an assessment of material threat. It is also to be expected if these charges are determined in pre-trial detention centres by unqualified prison staff, bypassing the judiciary, and using the vaguely defined and deeply ideological “[75 signs of extremism](#).”

The police tags used to list detainments in the “Konasheher list” contain some detail (“illegal religious teaching personnel”: 4 people) but most crimes listed generally correspond with broader ideological conceptions of threat to the Chinese party-state’s identity narratives and security practices at the neighbourhood-level (“Picking quarrels/disorderly behaviour” 寻衅滋事罪 3,145 charges, “advocating” 宣扬: 2,066, “interfering with stability focus people” 涉稳类重点人: 899; “opponents of stability investigations,” 涉稳核查对象: 843). These lists should be further analysed but initial findings confirm mass detention and community dispersal arbitrarily targets the Uyghur people, guided by the central party-state’s commands on pre-emptive indicators of signs of undesirable identity and thought.

Many individual cases of detention are listed as stemming from multiple crimes, perhaps most significantly in instances of “advocating” and “picking quarrels,” neither of which are violent crimes. The individual cases that correspond with listings on the Xinjiang Victim’s Database have not included trials or legal process. They are primarily determined in pre-trial detention centres and contribute towards explaining the gap between arrests and prosecutions during this period outlined in the [PRC Supreme People’s Procuratorate](#) 2018 report.

The detainees given shorter sentences (< 5 years) are most likely to be imprisoned locally (Kashgar prison; 809 cases) and most, but not all, larger sentences (> 5 years) are scattered across the region with families being separated (see: Appendix – People). 706 cases of female detainees are listed in Ili prison (see: Appendix – Detention Facilities), far from Kashgar, for sentences of approximately 10 years. Overall, these broad patterns identified correspond with practices observed across

the region, which target people for signs of thought, general misbehaviour, and dissatisfaction, as represented below:

Total: 10,362 “crimes” (罪名)

5,601 “mass disruption to social order” (聚众扰乱社会秩序罪). Average sentence: 9.6 years.

3,145 “Picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour” (寻衅滋事罪): 11.92 years.

2,066 “advocating” “terrorism, extremism” (宣扬 (恐怖主义, 极端主义罪)): 11.89 years.

194 “preparing terrorist activities” (准备实施恐怖活动罪): 12.3 years.

66 “participating in terrorist organisations” 参加恐怖组织罪: 11.8 years.

39 “preparing violent terrorist activities” 预备暴力恐怖活动罪: 15.7 years.

36 “coercing people to wear face coverings and extremist religious clothing” 强迫他人穿戴宣扬极端宗教服饰罪: 8.8 years.

18 “cover up activities” 窝藏包庇: 11.7 years.

9 “bigamy” 重婚罪: 4.3 years (4 charges combined with others).

Some crimes remain blank, including 10 year sentences.

The “Konasheher list” adds significant evidence of the arbitrary nature of mass detention of Uyghur people based on the perceived threat of Uyghurs per se. Cadres are given huge lists of “signs” to remember and as the “stability knowledge” test (section 4.2) showed, they are told to monitor “mood changes,” and looks of “shock” upon being questioned. 10,361 of 10,363 people detained are listed as Uyghur ethnicity (*weiwuerzu* 维吾尔族), 8,726 are male, and the home addresses listed reveal how specific townships, villages, and even streets have been targeted. Approximately 1 in 17 county residents are listed as detained during this period, affecting nearly 1 in 5 households (for full breakdown of figures, see: Appendix – targeted townships and villages in Shufu County). It is unrealistic to think that this many people can be guilty of genuine crimes or that the methods of identifying thought crimes and pre-crimes used to round up Uyghurs in every village (*cun* 村), and even every single housing block (*zu* 组) within each village, are

based on genuine indicators of threat or even genuine assessments of identity. Most villages see people detained from every single housing block.



Opal township (乌帕尔镇) has 1,209 cases of arbitrary detention named on the “Konasheher list,” with more than 1 in 7 households affected. Image source: Wikipedia.

Xi’s orders to optimise the population in Xinjiang are based on his explanation that concentrated Uyghur populations are security and development problems. The “Konasheher list” demonstrates how his solution to dramatically decrease the Uyghur proportion of the population includes dispersal of Uyghur communities through mass detention, micro-managed on a village-level with residents of every housing block broken up. Mass detention in Xinjiang is a system of arbitrary targeting of a people with the only genuinely systematic elements that all Uyghurs are under suspicion and all security personnel are ordered to round them up within the party’s co-ordinated institutional mechanisms commanded by Xi.

Conclusions

This report has shown how Xi Jinping has transformed the PRC's institutional and ideological control mechanisms using mass mobilisation and human surveillance to prevent opposition to his personalised, ideological authority, including destruction of identities and transformation of everyday thought in Xinjiang. Xi has reformed the party-state to personally enact and prevent any opposition to his security policy agenda, including genocidal practices in Xinjiang, such as cultural destruction (section 3), arbitrary mass detention (section 4.2) and community dispersal of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic-speaking Muslim communities (section 4.3). Xi's focus on policing everyday thought and identity is strictly imposed on cadres and security personnel through regular party meetings and education sessions to clearly outline the party-state's command structure, policy implementation procedures, his ideological principles relating to everyday identity, and the severe punishments for failing to implement his personal orders (section 2). Given the intensive mass human surveillance now linking party institutions, security services, and neighbourhoods in the "People's war on terror" (section 4.1), and that minor opposition to Xi's authority, security policies, or ideology, are national security threats, these become increasingly irrational or courageous actions for cadres, security practitioners, or individual citizens.

The meaning of security to the party-state under Xi has become expansive and nebulous. It shares familiar concerns to policymakers in most states but also includes culture, ideology, and everyday identity. Xi has intensified the party-state's focus on "political security", and "ideological" and "cultural security", with incontestable [ethnic assimilation \("fusion"\) policies](#) considered the resolution of national "contradictions," towards China's great revival (*weida fuxing* 伟大复兴). "Political security" in the "Xinjiang Papers" appears to be an authoritarian approach, referring to maintenance of centralised party institutions and command structures. However, "ideological security" goes much further, denoting citizens' self-identification with the content of the party-state's "[historical resolution](#)" (section 3.1), in which China's identity absorbs peripheral 'minority' cultures and

resists foreign cultures, including ‘harmonising’ and Sincising Islam towards a “new era”. Within the totalitarian logics of “ideological security”, Uyghur and other [non-Han groups](#)’ identification with language, history, and religion are, by default, national security threats, reflected in mass [detention practices](#) and the “[75 signs](#)” of religious extremism.

Will Xi change policy direction?

Xi describes Xinjiang policy as “[completely correct](#),” suggesting that the central party-state will continue its policy direction, though adaptations have already occurred. Xi staked his legitimacy on the success of his Xinjiang policy and will not choose to publicly change course. However, the “Xinjiang Papers”, and previous leaks, do reveal internal concerns regarding local leaders’ willingness to implement Xi’s policies, particularly the extensiveness of mass detention. The [transfer of arbitrarily detained Uyghurs](#) to forced labour facilities and standard prisons across China also suggest that Xi’s “painful *period* of interventionary treatment” means eventual scaling down of the camps and attempts to create a totalitarian hi-tech surveillance state with huge proportions of Uyghurs in forced labour or prison.

The departure of security-focused Chen Quanguo as Xinjiang’s party chief in January 2022 and appointment of the technocratic [Ma Xingrui](#), dubbed a key member of China’s “[aerospace clique](#),” alongside the policy “periods of overlay” analysed (section 4.2), suggest that the intensive period of mass detention has begun to wind down with millions of Uyghurs already in camps and dispersed across the region’s prisons. The party-state now seeks to attract more investment into the region, now that the Han proportion is increasing towards its “population optimisation” targets (section 4.3). [Zhao Kezhi](#) (PSB party secretary and Counter-terrorism leading group chair) cited Xi’s speech from the third Xinjiang Central Work meetings during his [2021 tour of Xinjiang](#) and [2022 meetings](#) in Beijing, reaffirming that grid-style management, one-minute response times, and adherence to strict prison stability standards have been achieved and will be strengthened. Zhao Kezhi and deputy, [Jiang Liyun](#), explain that a new central focus of Xinjiang policy is international, to “resolutely thwart attempts to ‘control China with

Xinjiang’ and ‘contain China with terror’,” namely, scholarly analysis of issues related to Xinjiang by experts from outside China, and “Islamic terrorism.”

What does this mean for policymakers in democratic states?

Policymakers in democracies will need to think in broad strategic terms about the long-term implications of Xi’s transformation of the PRC’s institutions and goals in China’s international relations, which fold everyday culture and development into a security agenda. Xi has shifted the PRC’s institutional framework from what was considered a bureaucratic-authoritarian state, tolerating no alternative sources of political authority or organisation, to a more personalised totalitarian state, with alternative identities and thought on history and culture treated as existential national security threats.

The capacity for intergenerational transmission of Uyghur identity or even protection from mass detention and torture in Xi’s system is limited. [Intergenerational separation](#) and [family breakups](#) are key tactics in Xi’s genocidal practices. Democratic policymakers will also be forced to address new focused areas as more Uyghurs are forced into exile and settle in democratic societies. Uyghur diaspora in [London](#), [Paris](#), the [USA](#), [Australia](#), and [Canada](#), are creating social spaces to maintain their identity and conduct academic research on how these practices affect their lives and China’s future. Nevertheless, they face surveillance and threats from the party-state in the [United Kingdom](#) and other democratic societies, which human rights groups describe as “[transnational repression](#).”

To a great extent, the success of Uyghurs’ efforts depend on the willingness of democratic societies to guarantee their freedom from [harassment by the Chinese authorities](#) and to support their research with rights to academic freedom. Uyghur diaspora also have rights to be free from the mental harm they currently experience with bad-faith public denials by Chinese officials, scholars, and student associations of their well-documented personal experiences of family separation and ethnic targeting. This [atrocities denial](#) does not constitute scholarly or respectful debate but

should be considered [hate crime](#) under UK law, as “motivated by hostility based on race” and “religion.”

Policymakers and analysts should be sympathetic but must be realistic about what Xi’s transformation of Chinese society means for all PRC diplomats, policymakers, and citizens, who would be risking their lives by publicly expressing thought or engaging in political or cultural exchange which contradicts Xi’s *ideas* regarding politics, history, or society. The implications of Xi’s political and social transformation affect every aspect of formal relations with PRC citizens and demand a deeper, longer-term strategic rethink amongst democratic policymakers. Neither “openness” and “dialogue” nor straight-forward “de-coupling” address the complexity of international relations with China. Xi’s party-state uses secrecy as a norm in all its political affairs but deploys narratives of open-ness and co-operation to support his political goals to maintain that secrecy. The PRC and global economy are already deeply interpenetrated, meaning that de-coupling can work in specific strategic areas but is not genuinely being pursued as a comprehensive strategy. Policymakers must grapple with the reality of the PRC’s power *and* its totalitarian institutional structure under Xi that shapes its diplomacy and political goals. Xi Jinping personally commands state terror that intends to commit genocide and uses diplomacy and economic interpenetration to achieve that goal, as well as preventing any opposition at home and abroad. However, Xi builds his power base on narratives that China’s existence is threatened by democracy, human rights, and the Uyghur people, which are easy to dismiss with evidence and open scholarly discussion.

Appendix – Targeted townships and villages in Shufu County

More in-depth analysis should be conducted using this data. The most significant initial conclusion is that the vast number of people affected mean it is unrealistic that these are genuine criminal sentences. Otherwise, the region would have experienced significantly higher levels of organised violence. Secondly, the fact that people are detained from every single housing block in each village listed in every township within the county shows that the detention methods are broad sweeps by the security services to arbitrarily target a people (“round up all those who should be rounded up”), rather than targeted against crime, genuine signs of potential crimes, or objective indicators of extremist ideology or identity.

Overall, about 1 in 23 people have been detained according to the “Konasheher list,” affecting between 1 in 5-6 households.³⁸ This figure does not control for multiple detainments in a single household, though these are not hugely significant. Discarding 0-14 year-olds who are not listed in the detainments (63,409 in total, and excluding transferred townships), the adult population is 169,791, then around 1/17 adults have been detained. The overall sex ratio of detainments is approximately 75% male to 25% female. The data listed below breaks down the number of people detained in every township (*xiang* 乡) in the county, listing each

³⁸ A total of 9,889 people are listed as detained in Shufu county. The population statistics used are “total population” from the 2010 census. Source: Chinageoexplorer. “Total population” for the county is 310,605 [158,730 (male), 72,917 (households)]. The following townships are included in these statistics but have been transferred to other county administrations: Yingwusi tang (35,747; 8,164 households), Awati xiang (30,345; 6,496 households), transferred to Shule County and Akekashen (11,313; 2,470 households), transferred to Kashgar city in October 2014. Accounting for these transfers, the overall population is 233,200 with 55,787 households. Overall, approximately 1/23 people have been detained, affecting between 1 in 5-6 households, without controlling for multiple detainments in a single household. If we remove 0-14 year-olds (63,409 in total, excluding transferred townships), the adult population is 169,791, then around 1/17 have been detained. The overall sex ratio of detainments is approximately 75% male to 25% female.

village (*cun* 村) affected, and even each housing block (*zu* 组). These are listed using this format to illustrate how mass detention proceeds block-by-block and door-to-door.

Townships and Towns³⁹

站敏乡 911 (Zemin Township)

Population: 22,539 -6,030 0-14 year-olds = 16,509; 11,559 male; 5,595 households.

Detained: 1/18.1 adults, 1/6.14 households

英力克村 112 (1 组⁴⁰: 25; 2: 16; 3: 31; 4: 13; 5: 13; 6: 5; 7: 9)

其格曼村 73 (1 组: 15; 2: 8; 3: 14; 4: 18; 5: 5; 6: 8; 7: 4; 8: 1)

木苏曼库恰村 64 (1 组: 7; 2: 16; 3: 8; 4: 14; 5: 8; 6: 8; 7: 3)

斯提拉村 56 (1 组: 15; 2: 15; 3: 14; 4: 12)

依尼沙克村 49 (1 组: 8; 2: 6; 3: 9; 4: 5; 5: 7; 6: 10; 7: 4)

库恰村 47 (1 组: 7; 2: 5; 3: 2; 4: 1; 5: 1; 6: 2; 7: 6; 8: 9; 9: 14)

库力其给日克村 46 (1 组: 7; 2: 3; 3: 7; 4: 15; 5: 13; 6: 1)

站敏村 46 (1 组: 15; 2: 8; 3: 12; 4: 6; 5: 3; 6: 2)

其给日克村 46 (1 组: 7; 2: 3; 3: 7; 4: 15; 5: 13; 6: 1)

尤喀日克克孜力克村 44 (1 组: 11; 2: 10; 3: 20; 4: 3)

亚马西拉村 43 (1 组: 9; 2: 12; 3: 15; 4: 7)

阿依丁村 41 (1 组: 19; 2: 9; 3: 13)

纳斯村 36 (1 组: 7; 2: 13; 3: 15; 4: 1)

尤喀日克斯提拉村 32 (1 组: 5; 2: 9; 3: 6; 4: 12)

木苏曼阿恰皮拉勒村 30 (1 组: 3; 2: 5; 3: 10; 4: 8; 5: 4)

尤喀日克站敏村 28 (1 组: 6; 2: 8; 3: 14)

³⁹ These figures are the key villages targeted and the numbers refer to number of people detained.

⁴⁰ A *zu* is a small group of houses or apartment block, assigned a number for administrative purposes.

吐万克克孜力克村 29 (1 组: 8; 2: 2; 3: 12; 4: 7)
园艺场 25 (1 组: 13; 2: 9; 园艺场 001:1; 园艺场 012: 1; 园艺场 022: 1)
库如力村 25 (1 组: 10; 2: 9; 3: 6)
木苏曼阿恰派西塔克村 23 (1 组: 4; 2: 5; 3: 4; 4: 10)
吾鲁汗布依村 23 (1 组: 8; 2: 4; 3: 11)
15 村 2 (3 组: 1; 4: 1)
11 村 2 (3 组: 1; 4: 1)
啤酒花场 2

沙依巴格乡 892 (Saybag township)

Population: 22,827 -6,490 0-14 year-olds = 16,337; 11,569 male; 5,185 households
Detained: 1/18.3 adults, 1/5.8 households

肖尔村 130 (1 组: 18; 2: 7, 3: 13; 4: 12; 5: 24; 6: 9; 7: 11; 8: 12; 9: 23; 10: 1)
阿克提其村 122 (1 组: 19; 2: 17; 3: 17; 4: 18; 5: 16; 6: 9; 7: 8; 8: 18)
喀扎克拉村 47 (1 组: 3; 2: 15; 3: 11; 4: 14; 5: 4)
库甫斯吾依村 122 (1 组: 9; 2: 4; 3: 7; 4: 29; 5: 18; 6: 11; 7: 25; 8: 10; 9: 9)
尤喀日克喀帕村 56 (1 组: 6; 2: 9; 3: 21; 4: 11; 5: 7; 6: 2)
种畜场 5 (County livestock farm)

木什乡 724 (Mush township)

Population: 14,671 - 3,955 0-14 year-olds = 10,716; 7,518 male; 3,332 households
Detained: 1/14.8 adults, 1/ 4.6 households

艾甫拉提村 108 (1 组: 9; 2: 3; 3: 9; 4: 13; 5: 10; 6: 15; 7: 18; 8: 22; 9: 9)
吾斯坦布依村 82 (1 组: 9; 2: 9; 3: 8; 4: 4; 5: 4; 6: 5; 7: 7; 8: 4; 9: 5; 10: 9; 11: 4; 12:
7; 13: 7)
西来克沙依村 38 (1 组: 7; 2: 12; 3: 8; 4: 11)
尼亚孜阿瓦浪村 74 (1 组: 13; 2: 3; 3: 24; 4: 16; 5: 18)

开迪米加依村 97 (1 组: 11; 2: 6; 3: 7; 4: 17; 5: 13; 6: 19; 7: 9; 8: 15)
英吾斯坦布依村 103 (1 组: 20; 2: 20; 3: 13; 4: 5; 5: 13; 6: 16; 7: 16)
布斯坦村 89 (1 组: 22; 2: 14; 3: 12; 4: 14; 5: 6; 6: 1; 7: 12; 8: 8)
艾斯力木什村 93 (1 组: 18; 2: 8; 3: 15; 4: 7; 5: 5; 6: 10; 7: 4; 8: 17; 9: 7; 10: 2)
1 村 1 (2 组: 1)
2 村 2 (4 组: 1; 7: 1)
3 村 2 (3 组: 1; 7: 1)
4 村 12 (1 组: 2; 2: 1; 3: 1; 5: 1; 6: 1; 7: 2; 8: 4)
6 村 1 (6 组: 1)
7 村 5 (4 组: 1; 6: 1; 10: 1; 13: 1; one address without 组)
8 村 2 (1 组: 1; 3: 1)
9 村 5 (6 组: 4; 7: 1)
明尧勒村 10 (1 组: 7; 2: 1; 3: 2)

布拉克苏乡 1,940 (Bulaqsu township)

Population: 38,327 - 11,059 0-14 year-olds = 27,268; 19,612 male; 8,438 households

Detained: approximately 1/14 adults, nearly 1 / 4 households

塔哈其英其开村 240 (1 组 : 30; 2: 16; 3: 6; 4: 17; 5: 21; 6: 15; 7: 9; 8: 9; 9: 36; 10: 40; 11: 41)
阿拉吾依拉英其开村 219 (1 组: 13; 2: 16; 3: 10; 4: 20; 5: 34; 6: 16; 7: 25; 8: 14; 9: 7; 10: 24; 11: 15; 12: 13; 13: 12;)
代苏村 150 (1 组: 19; 2: 6; 3: 18; 4: 26; 5: 10; 6: 15; 7: 17; 8: 19; 9: 11; 10: 9)
乌拉木巴斯提村 140 (1 组: 10; 2: 6; 3: 26; 4: 10; 5: 32; 6:13; 7: 20; 8: 23)
克孜坎瓦特村 126 (1 组: 17; 2: 13; 3: 7; 4: 8; 5: 15; 6: 4; 7: 10; 8: 8; 9: 13; 10: 16; 11: 9; 12: 6)
吐纳巴合村 105 (1 组: 16; 2: 13; 3: 18; 4: 8; 5: 2; 6: 13; 7: 20; 8: 14, 2118 号: 1).

亚喀西村 95 (1 组: 8; 2: 15; 3: 10; 4: 12; 5: 10; 6: 15; 7: 17; 8: 8)

库纳吾依拉村 72 (1 组: 13; 2: 19; 3: 14; 4: 12; 5: 9; 6: 5)

吐尔恰瓦合村 68 (1 组: 22; 2: 6; 3: 11; 4: 9; 5: 6; 6: 14)

英艾日克村 61(1 组: 3; 2: 14; 3: 19; 4: 6; 5: 13; 6: 5; 8:1)

恰热克村 46 (1 组: 6; 2: 9; 3: 7; 4: 8; 5: 9; 6: 7)

红旗农场 8 (1 组: 1)

铁日木乡 360 (Terim township)

Population: 5,117 - 1,503 0-14 year-olds = 3,614; 2,652 male; 1,292 households

Detained: 1/10 adults, 1/3.59 households

尤喀日克铁力木村 104 (1 组: 25; 2: 15; 3: 20; 4: 7; 5: 13; 6: 18; 7: 6)

吐万克铁力木村 113 (1 组 : 7; 2: 33; 3: 12; 4: 24; 5: 22; 6: 15)

吐提库力村 84 (1 组: 24; 2: 22; 3: 23; 4: 12; 5: 3)

尤力洪布合拉村 45 (1 组: 9; 2: 13; 3: 11; 4: 12)

No.1 村: 3

No.2 村: 3

No.3: 村 4

No.4 村: 2

阿亚克铁日木村 1(4 组: 1)

托克扎克镇 774 (Tokkuzak)

Population:34,010 -8,106 0-14 year-olds = 25,904; 16,681 male; 8,656 households

Detained: 1/33.5 adults, 1/11.2 households

阿亚格曼干村 231 (1 组: 7, 2: 6, 3:23; 4: 9; 5: 25; 6: 19; 7: 14; 8: 23; 9: 13; 10: 46;

11: 33; 12: 7; 13: 1) (Also, 阿亚曼干村 1)

肖古孜村 85 (1 组: 13; 2: 13; 3: 3; 4: 3; 5: 16; 6: 9; 7: 8; 8: 20)

尤喀尔克曼干村 81(1 组: 17; 2: 13; 3: 19; 4: 12; 5: 13; 6: 7)
伊什来木其村 76 (1 组: 9; 2: 4; 3: 4; 4: 17; 5: 7; 6: 13; 7: 17; 9:5)
蔬菜村 70 (1 组: 7; 2: 17; 3: 24; 4: 22)
皮拉勒村 76 (1 组: 10; 2: 15; 3: 9; 4: 7; 5: 7; 6: 9; 7: 7; 8: 12)
人民北路 41
人民南路 16
胜利西路 13
团结南路 12
站敏东路 11
团结北路 11
胜利东路 8
5 村 7 (1 组: 1; 2: 1; 3: 2; 4: 3)
文化北路 7
4 村 6 (7 组: 3; 8: 1; 9: 2)
良种场 3 (this is 阿亚曼干村)
肖古孜西路 3
伊什来木其东路 3
3 村 2 (4 组: 2)
1 村 2 (4 组: 1; 6: 1)
文化南路 1 (Also, 南文化路 1)
曼干东路 1
曼干西路 1
站敏西路 1

乌帕尔镇 1,209 (Opal)

Population: 34,150 –9,143 0-14 year-olds =25,007; 17,714 male; 8,321 households

Detained: nearly 1/20 adults, 1/6.88 households

阿克吾斯坦村 67 (1 组: 1; 2: 10; 3: 15; 5: 20; 6: 21;)
拜西巴格村 72 (1 组: 1; 2: 11; 3: 17; 4: 13; 5: 17; 6: 2; 7: 11)
巴西亚日吾村 75 (1 组: 2; 2: 1; 3: 13; 4: 12; 5: 10; 6: 8; 7: 7; 8: 6; 9: 14; 10: 2)
肖塔村 56 (1 组: 2; 2: 9; 3: 7; 4: 4; 5: 5; 6: 15; 7: 2; 8: 9; 9: 3)
阿依丁库力村 57 (1 组: 8; 2: 8; 3: 12; 4: 8; 5: 10; 6: 5; 7: 6)
阿恰村 96 (1 组: 12; 2: 13; 3: 7; 4: 16; 5: 7; 6: 7; 7: 13; 8: 18; 9: 3)
约力吉格代村 92 (1 组: 15; 2: 15; 3: 25; 4: 11; 5: 7; 6: 8; 7: 7; 8: 2)
喀拉瓦西村 94 (1 组: 6; 2: 15; 3: 14; 4: 6; 5: 1; 6: 8; 7: 4; 8: 20; 9: 11; 10: 5; 11: 4)
毛拉木比格村 42 (1 组: 10; 2: 5; 3: 6; 4: 7; 5: 7; 6: 5; 7: 2)
多合拉提村 68 (1 组: 11; 2: 4; 3: 8; 4: 10; 5: 7; 6: 2; 7: 6; 8: 12; 9: 8)
库克其村 88 (1 组: 4; 2: 10; 3: 10; 4: 3; 5: 9; 6: 4; 7: 6; 9: 3; 10: 3; 11: 4; 12: 10; 13:
13; 14: 8; one without 组)
奴开提村 73 (1 组: 12; 2: 17; 3: 11; 4: 7; 5: 12; 6: 9; 7: 5)
库木巴格村 82 (1 组: 4; 2: 12; 3: 9; 4: 3; 5: 5; 6: 1; 7: 10; 8: 5; 9: 4; 10: 10; 11: 2; 12:
4; 13: 13)
喀拉吾斯塘村 59 (1 组: 11; 2: 7; 3: 12; 4: 13; 5: 7; 7: 9)
吾布拉提村 28 (1 组: 11; 2: 10; 3: 7)
亚日吾村 65 (1 组: 7; 2: 4; 3: 3; 4: 11; 5: 5; 6: 6; 7: 8; 8: 5; 9: 4; 10: 12)
农场 4
1 村 7 (1 组: 2; 2: 4; 6: 1)
2 村 3 (2 组: 1; 3: 1; 4: 1)
3 村 6 (3 组: 1; 7: 2; 8: 2; 10: 1)
4 村 3 (5 组: 1; 7: 2)
5 村 2 (3 组: 1; 5: 1)
6 村 8 (1 组: 2; 2: 1; 3: 2; 6: 2; 13: 1)
7 村 9 (1 组: 1; 2: 2; 4: 1; 10: 2; 11: 2; 13: 1)
8 村 3 (8 组: 2; 9: 1)
9 村 4 (1 组: 1; 5: 2; 6: 1)

10 村 14 (1 组: 3; 2: 1; 3: 2; 5: 2; 6: 3; 7: 1; 8: 1; one without 组)

11 村 2 (3 组: 1; 4: 1)

12 村 4 (1 组: 1; 3: 1; 7: 1; 8: 1)

13 村 6 (2 组: 2; 3: 2; 5: 1; 6: 1)

14 村 5 (1 组: 1; 2: 1; 5: 3)

15 村 13 (2 组: 5; 3: 1; 4: 3; 5: 1; 6: 3)

16 村 3 (1 组: 2; 3: 1)

塔什米力克乡 1,424 (Tashmiliq township)

Population: 27,989 – 8,050 0-14 year-olds = 19,939; 14,596 male; 6,566 households

Detained: 1/14 adults, 1/4.6 households

尤喀日克提提尔村 104 (1 组: 11; 2: 8; 3: 7; 4: 9; 5: 13; 6: 17; 7: 9; 8: 4; 9: 19; 10: 7)

阿亚格提提尔村 71 (1 组: 26; 2: 12; 3: 11; 4: 11; 5: 11)

塔什米力克乡哈力塔库恰村 60 (1 组: 13; 2: 27; 3: 7; 4: 13)

兰干镇 875 (Lengger)

Population: 18,785 - 5,052 0-14 year-olds = 13,733; 9,626 male; 4,663 households

Detained: 1/15.7 adults, 1/5.33 households

吾吉米力克村 91 (1 组: 4; 2: 3; 3: 10; 4: 13; 5: 1; 6: 18; 7: 10; 8: 12; 9: 3; 10: 5; 11: 12)

阿克吾依拉村 83 (1 组: 10; 2: 2; 3: 18; 4: 17; 5: 18; 6: 8; 7: 7; 8: 3)

林场 103 (1 组: 39; 2: 48; 3: 16)

吾库萨克镇 769 (Oghusaq)

Population: 14,795 – 4,021 0-14 year-olds = 10,774; 7,544 male; 3,769 households

Detained: 1/14 adults, 1/4.9 households

吐万克吾库沙克村 141 (1 组: 12; 2: 11; 3: 15; 4: 14; 5: 24; 6: 15; 7: 5; 8: 3; 9: 11; 10: 16; 11: 15)

阿克陶县 27 (separate county)

南大街 1

镇府路 2

巴仁乡 13 (township)

库尔干村 3

巴仁村 1

克孜勒吾斯坦村 2

沙依瓦克村 1

加衣村 1

乡库木村 3

乡古勒瓦克村 1

乡墩瓦克村 1

皮拉力乡 6

皮拉力路 2

皮拉力乡 1

敦都热路 1

哈拉苏路 1

拜什铁热克路 1 (3 组: 1)

加马铁力克乡 3

托塔依村 3

喀热开其克乡 2

古扎里路 1

阿克吾依拉北路 1

Appendix – Detention facilities

List of facilities on the “Konasheher list”

Bingtuan prisons: 1603 cases⁴¹ (Huaqiao: 227; Nankou: 231; [Fangcaohu](#)⁴²: 161; Qiewei: 121; Qigaimaidan:121; Piqiakesongdi : 89; Gaimilike: 70; [Shihezi](#): 60; Shahe: 71; Ala’er: 62; Xin’an: 42; Zhongjiazhuang 50; Beiye: 40; Tumuxiuke: 41; Kekekule: 40; [Tamen](#): 39; Milan: 35; Urumqi: 32; Wuluke: 20; Kuitin⁴³ (Ili): 9)

Kashgar Prison: 809

Ili: 706

[Women’s prison:](#) 526

[Turpan:](#) 510

[Kizilsu:](#) 506

Bayinguoleng: 452

No.4: 435

[Shaya:](#) 434

[No.1 \(Urumqi\):](#) 431⁴⁴

No.3: 420

[Changji:](#) 400

[Korla High-security:](#)⁴⁵ 385

[Newly seized criminals](#) (*xinshoufan*): 369

[Kashgar Women’s Prison:](#) 359

[Hotan:](#) 357

Xinyuan (Ili): 306

⁴¹ Including 32 to Bingtuan Korla.

⁴² Most are 10+, including “advocating.”

⁴³ All 10+.

⁴⁴ Almost all 10+, most 15+

⁴⁵ These are for a range of offences and most <7 years. No obvious distinction with other Korla prisons.

[Wusu](#): 306

[Aksu](#): 252

Fuhai: 196

Yutian: 193

Korla: 67

Ka'erding: 37

No.5: 13

Detention facilities in Shufu County

Kashgar Women's Prison (喀什女子监狱)



[Kashgar Women's Prison](#) (喀什女子监狱). Image source: [XVD](#). Address: Bostan Village, Mush Township, Shufu County, Kashgar Prefecture (喀什地区疏附县木什乡博斯坦村).

Founded as [juvenile correction facility](#) in 1957. In 2012, new construction began, becoming a women's prison in 2015. It is also the base for [Kashgar Yuxin Industry & Commerce LLC](#), which moved there in 2015 just after the prison began to receive inmates. Since the 1980s, the facility has been used for theory and physical training for the People's Armed Police and the surrounding fields used for wheat production. In 2019, the PRC Ministry of Finance issued a [tender](#) for the expansion of the prison's textile workshops. [Kashgar Intermediate People's Court](#) issued reduced sentences 2018 for inmates for "working hard to complete labour responsibilities." Sentences in the "Konasheher list" vary from around 4-10 years for most charges listed. 359 out of 1,557 women on the list have been sent here. The rest are sent to Women's Prison (No.2 Prison, Urumqi) or Yili Prison. The company's legal representative, Hu Xinqi is also the [secretary of the prison's party committee](#). Kashgar Yuxin Industry & Commerce LLC is a [subsidiary](#) of the larger [Xinjiang Huaxin Rui'an Group](#) that owns most non-Bingtuan prison enterprises in the region.

Konasheher County Industrial Park Public Housing Complex (疏附县工业园区公租房小区).



[Re-education camp no.26 \(新疆再教育集中营 26\)](#), Konasheher County Industrial Park Public Housing Complex (疏附县工业园区公租房小区).⁴⁶

The camp was built by transforming a public-housing complex in the Industrial Park. During 2018-2019, wire-fencing and a lookout post were removed, suggesting its function has changed. In an interview with [Radio Free Asia](#) in 2021, a local policeman confirmed existence of the camp in Opal township, where it held translator and Kashgar high-school teacher, [Ahmetjan Juma](#), between 2017-2019 for possessing an “extremist book.” The plan for a “[Transformation-through-legal-education school](#)” (法制教育转化学校) in Konasheher/Shufu County's industrial park area is stated explicitly in a [2017 tender](#) from the Shufu County justice department worth 140 million RMB, including plans for a new pre-trial detention centre and party training centre.

⁴⁶ This is not listed on the “Konasheher list” but is the only other known detainment facility in Shufu county.

Key facilities named on the “Konasheher list”

Ili Prison ([伊犁监狱](#))



[Ili Prison \(伊犁监狱\)](#), 2019.



Source: [Ili Prison](#), reporter. “Healthy heart education” session.

Ili (women's) prison lies on a site [first established](#) by “reform through labour work” (*laogai gongzuo* 劳改工作) management leaders in 1964. It is located on East Airport Street (飞机场东街) in Ghulja city. The enterprise that runs the prison is owned by the [Xinjiang Huaxin Rui'an Group Co, Ltd](#). It is run by [Xie Xiaoqi](#) (谢晓旗), a member of the Yili Prison Party committee and manager of Yili Yurun Commerce and Trade Co, Ltd, listed as a [subsidiary of Huaxin Rui'an](#). The company runs the prison's [attached factory workshops](#).

On 18th September 2021, [Ili Prefecture Propaganda Department](#) issued a notification (*tongbao* 通报) on the “Investigative situation regarding delegation of responsibility problem of the XUAR no.1 ecological protection supervisory group,” posted on Ili Prefecture government website 8 days later. The notification explains that the prison is under direct supervision of the co-ordinating group of Yining City management bureau (伊宁市城市管理局协调), and its responsible person (*fuzhe ren* 负责人) must co-ordinate with the City management bureau chief to respond to incidents in the related Yining City Industrial Park (伊宁市开发区). The prison holds property rights (产权) over goods produced and on sale at or from the district. Hebei based companies ([Hebei Pinganxian Yiqiao Jiaotong Anquan Sheshi Gongcheng Youxian Gongsi](#) and [Anpingxian Shengying Jinsbu Zhipin Youxian Gongsi](#)) and provide “steel nets and walls” (钢网墙) for the prison, including barb-wired fencing.

In May 2019, [XUAR Justice department](#) gave the “Xinjiang Youth May 4th prize” to Kazakh policeman (head of 4th section of prison) for contribution to “stability, security, and development.” On the 31st, July 2019, [Luo Jian](#) (罗健), the secretary of Ili Prison Party committee and government committee member met with the Party deputy secretary and People's Armed Police (PAP) leaders, thanking the People's Armed Police for their persistent work. On the same day, the Prison held a “[healthy heart education](#)” session (*xinli jiankang jiaoyu* 心理健康教育) for the Federation of Trade Unions and the People's Armed Police to study the reasons for low production and “detailed analysis of negative reactions that lead to psychological discomfort when people are placed under long-term pressure.” On November 18th, 2019, the prison held an education session to study the “[spirit of the 19th Party Congress](#),” emphasising the “security spirit” (*anquan jingshen* 安全精神) in the disseminated “important speeches of Xi Jinping.”

Kizilsu Prison (克孜勒苏监狱)



Kizilsu Prison (克孜勒苏监狱). Image source: [XVD](#). Slogan pictured: “Reform through culture, reform through labour.” Location: [Atush, Aguh Township](#).

The prison is located in a rural area of Aguh township in Atush, Kizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture, which borders Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The region is often referred to as “backward” in party-state narratives, including a land of “[simple and crude caves](#),” prior to the establishment of military farms in the early 1960s. The region is primarily populated by Uyghurs and Kyrgyz, and has experienced rapidly declining birth rates as researched by [Adrian Zenz](#), mandates towards which are noted in local [Family Planning Committee](#) documents. Like Yili prison, most sentences given on the “Konasheher list” are for 10 years or less.

Construction of the prison began around 2011 and [Maralbeshi prison](#) relocated here in 2015. The [Kelakeqin Agro-Pastoral LLC](#) (克拉克勤农牧有限责任公司), formerly operating in Maralbeshi prison and a subsidiary of Huaxin Rui’an operates out of the prison, as noted in a 2017 [assembly line tender](#). The company lists registered capital of 7,021,000 RMB and specialises in cotton processing, often associated with forced labour in the region, and other agricultural goods. Reduction in prison sentences for completing labour tasks are listed by the [Kizilsu Prefecture People’s Intermediary court](#). [Liu Hong \(刘洪\)](#) is listed as the enterprise manager of the prison and Prison party committee member.

Turpan Prison (吐鲁番监狱)



Turpan Prison (吐鲁番监狱). Image source: [XVD](#). Address: 101 North Yucai Road, Daheyan Municipality, Turpan City (吐鲁番市大河沿镇育才北路 101 号).

Turpan prison (formerly Donghu prison) began as a site of [penal mining grounds](#) in 1984 as an offshoot of Urumqi no.1 prison. It was established by a party brigade (矿山大队党支部) leading prisoners sent to Daheyan municipality. The site been used as a site of [Donghu cement factory](#), using forced labour in [cement production](#) since 1993 and officially became Turpan prison in 1998. A [2014 tender](#) shows the site is used as a processing factory workshop. A [2021 tender](#) shows the prison spent 15 million RMB on building secure solitary confinement cells.

Xinjiang Women's Prison (新疆女子监狱)



Xinjiang Women's Prison. Image source: [XVD](#). Address: 乌鲁木齐市新市区东路路 1327 号 (north of Urumqi East Railway station).

The prison is the site of high-profile detainees including [Gulmire Imin](#). The facility has only operational since 2009, though the former women's prison ([no.2 prison](#)) was established in 1983. It has been associated with Laogai forced labour and is the home of [Xinjiang Qixin Clothing LLC](#) (新疆启新服装有限责任公司) ([promotional video](#)), associated with [forced labour](#). [Aidecheng Clothing LTD](#) (新疆爱德诚服装有限公司) is also registered at this address. [Urumqi People's Intermediate Court](#) list reduction of prison sentences for “completing labour tasks.”



[Xinjiang Qixin Clothing LLC](#) stall at the Urumqi Expo Centre. Image source: XVD.

Appendix – Ownership and investments

[Xinjiang Huaxin Rui'an Group](#) runs most non-Bingtuan prison enterprises in the region ([full list here](#)). From 24th March, 2014, [Fan Jun](#) was chair of the group and Deputy Director of the Department of Justice of the XUAR government, as well as Party Committee Secretary and Director of the XUAR Prison Administration Bureau. Fan Retired on July 5th, 2021, being replaced by [Li Guanghui](#) ([XUAR Party Committee member of the Justice Department](#), XUAR Prison Management Party Committee Secretary and head, XUAR Political co-ordination committee member, [deputy secretary of Turpan party committee](#), secretary of political and legal committee, Internet communications Party work committee secretary).

Registered address: 新疆乌鲁木齐市沙依巴克区黄河路 380 号

Registered capital (listed as national company standard): \$159,280,000

Subscribed capital contribution (cash, 8 January 2010): 206,859,500 RMB (nearly \$33m) 新疆维吾尔自治区国有资产监督管理委员会 (XUAR state-owned property supervision and management committee) (*related companies: none*)

[2020 Annual Report:](#)

[100% state-owned shares](#) (no share trading listed, no inward or outward investments listed)

Listed Shareholder: 新疆维吾尔自治区监狱管理局 (XUAR Prison Management Bureau)

No inward investments listed. 32 outward investments listed.⁴⁷ Many in Xinjiang construction and property development companies (200,000 RMB except where listed).

[沙湾谦容鼎立商贸有限责任公司](#) (2021)⁴⁸ Trade

⁴⁷ Blocked from the site while compiling the list. 24 of 32 are listed below.

[昌吉鼎新服装有限责任公司](#) (2021) Clothing

[新疆润达工贸有限责任公司](#) (2021) Industry and Trade

[新疆嘉世商贸有限责任公司](#) (2021) Business and Trade

[喀什鑫喀商贸有限公司](#) (2021) Business and Trade

[新源县伊新瑞源工贸有限责任公司](#) (2019) Industry and Trade

[乌鲁木齐北辰众鑫商贸有限责任公司](#) (2019) Business and Trade

[阿克苏圆梦商贸有限责任公司](#) (2019) Business and Trade

[阿克苏鑫鑫商贸有限公司](#) (2019) (300,000RMB) Business and Trade

[和田玉河服饰有限责任公司](#) (2019) Clothing

[新疆华新博纳商贸有限公司](#) (2020) (9,180,000 RMB) Business and Trade

[北京新汇国信商务酒店有限公司](#) (2010) (100,000 RMB) Business and Trade and Hotels

[乌鲁木齐顺康达商贸有限责任公司](#) (2005) (8,000,000 RMB) Business and Trade

[喀什牌楼农场有限责任公司](#) (2010) (11,710,000 RMB) Agriculture

[阿瓦提县卡尔墩农场有限责任公司](#) (2000) (8,065,000 RMB) Agriculture

[沙雅塔里木润城农牧有限责任公司](#) (1990) (12,670,000 RMB) Agriculture

[喀什育新工贸有限责任公司](#) (2010) (20,000,000 RMB) Business and Trade

[伊犁雨润商贸有限责任公司](#) (2010) (3,080,000 RMB) Business and Trade

[新源县伊新瑞源工贸有限责任公司](#) (2019) Business and Trade

[乌鲁木齐瑞安宏达商贸有限责任公司](#) (2011) (2,000,000 RMB) Business and Trade

[于田瑞丰农牧有限责任公司](#) (1998) (3,570,000 RMB) Animal husbandry

[新疆巴州博胜农牧有限责任公司](#) (2010) (3,180,000 RMB) Animal husbandry

[库尔勒瑞安旭彤商贸有限责任公司](#) (2014) (3,000,000 RMB) Business and Trade

[库车新盛农牧有限责任公司](#) (2000) (3,590,000 RMB) Animal husbandry

⁴⁸ Years refer to the establishment of the company.

Appendix – People

The people listed here are those named on the “Konasheher list” whose cases have already been analysed and reported on the Xinjiang Victim’s Database website. The information recorded (e.g., names, ID numbers, police tags, dates, and accused crimes) is consistent in both sources.

- 1) [Ghopur Qadir \(吾普尔·喀迪尔\)](#). **Crime:** 寻衅滋事罪、聚众扰乱社会秩序 (“Picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour, gathering crowds to disrupt social order”), **Sentence:** 10 years, 11 months, **Location:** 兵团且末监狱 (Bingtuan Qiewei Prison).
- 2) [Memeteli Abdureshit \(麦麦提艾力·阿布都热西提\)](#). **Crime:** 寻衅滋事罪、预备暴力恐怖罪 (“Picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour, planning terrorist activities”), **Sentence:** 15 years, 11 months, **Location:** 兵团塔门监狱 (Bingtuan Tamen Prison, Aral city, Aksu Prefecture).



Memeteli’s case has already been documented by [Amnesty International](#). Memeteli owned a car repair shop. He is the brother of [Emetjan Abdureshit](#), tradesperson,

sentenced for 7 years. Son of [Tajigul Qadir](#), homemaker, sentenced for 13 years. Son of [Abdureshit Tohti](#), elementary school teacher, sentenced for 17 years. All family members were sentenced in the space of a year and sent to different facilities for similar charges. His sister, [Nursiman](#), remains abroad.

- 3) [Abduweli Kerim](#) (阿不都外力·克力木). **Crime:** 利用宗教极端破坏法律实施罪, 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“using religious extremism to undermine the implementation of law, gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 10 years, 11 months. **Location:** 沙雅监狱 ([Shaya](#) Prison).
- 4) [Muhter Salih](#) (木合塔尔·沙力). **Crime:** 宣扬恐怖主义, 极端主义物品持有罪、聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“advocating terrorism, possessing extremist objects, gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 5 years. **Location:** 库尔勒高度戒备监狱 ([Korla High-security](#) Prison).
- 5) [Memeteli Rozi](#) (麦麦提艾力·肉孜). **Crime:** 参加恐怖组织罪 (“participating in terrorist organisations”). **Sentence:** 7 years. **Location:** 喀什监狱 (Kashgar Prison).
- 6) [Abduqadirjan Abdurehim](#) (阿卜杜喀迪尔江·阿卜杜热伊木). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 7 years. **Location:** 库尔勒高度戒备监狱 ([Korla High-security](#) Prison).
- 7) [Alimjan Rozi](#) (阿力木江·如则). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 6 years. **Location:** 喀什监狱 (Kashgar Prison).
- 8) [Ablimit Yantaq](#) (阿卜力米提·延塔克). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 7 years. **Location:** 喀什监狱 (Kashgar Prison).
- 9) [Enwer Hoshur](#) (艾尼瓦尔·吾守尔). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 7 years. **Location:** 沙雅监狱 ([Shaya](#) Prison).
- 10) [Shemshidin Sawut](#) (谢木西丁·萨伍提). **Crime:** 宣扬恐怖主义, 极端主义罪、煽动实施恐怖活动罪, 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“advocating terrorism and extremism, incitement to commit terrorist activities, gathering

- crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 15 years. **Location:** 第一监狱 ([No.1](#) Prison, Urumqi).
- 11) [Kerim Zunun \(克热木·祖农\)](#). **Crime:** 寻衅滋事罪 (“Picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour”). **Sentence:** 10 years. **Location:** 新收犯监狱 ([Newly seized criminals](#) Prison).
 - 12) [Memetimin Huseyin \(麦麦提依明·乌斯音\)](#). **Crime:** 利用极端主义破坏法律实施罪 (“using extremism to damage law enforcement”). **Sentence:** 5 years. **Location:** 乌鲁木齐监狱 (Urumqi Prison).
 - 13) [Mehsum Imam \(麦合苏木·依马木\)](#). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 7 years. **Location:** 喀什监狱 (Kashgar Prison).
 - 14) [Ababekri Memetimin \(阿巴拜科日·麦麦提伊敏\)](#). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 7 years. **Location:** 阿克苏监狱 ([Aksu](#) Prison).
 - 15) [Turghunjan Erkin \(图尔贡江·艾尔肯\)](#). **Crime:** 预备暴力恐怖活动罪 (“preparing violent terrorist activities”). **Sentence:** 12 years. **Location:** 兵团且末监狱 (Bingtuan Qiewei Prison).
 - 16) [Gheni Dolet \(艾尼·多来提\)](#). **Crime:** 寻衅滋事罪 (“Picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour”). **Sentence:** 8 years. **Location:** 喀什监狱 (Kashgar Prison).
 - 17) [Eziz Tohti \(艾孜则·托合提\)](#). **Crime:** 利用宗教极端破坏法律实施罪, 寻衅滋事罪 (“using religious extremism to undermine the implementation of law, “Picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour”). **Sentence:** 20 years. **Location:** 第一监狱 ([No.1](#) Prison, Urumqi).
 - 18) [Memeteli Qutluq \(麦麦提艾力·库吐力克\)](#). **Crime:** 宣扬恐怖主义, 极端主义罪、煽动实施恐怖活动罪 (“advocating terrorism and extremism, incitement to commit terrorist activities”). **Sentence:** 11 years, **Location:** 阿克苏监狱 ([Aksu](#) Prison).
 - 19) [Yasin Turdi \(亚森·吐尔迪\)](#). **Crime:** 寻衅滋事罪 (“Picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour”). **Sentence:** 10 years. **Location:** 沙雅监狱 ([Shaya](#) Prison).

- 20) [Turghun Abdukerim \(图尔贡·阿卜杜克热木\)](#). **Crime:** 利用极端主义破坏法律实施罪 (“using extremism to damage law enforcement”). **Sentence:** 7 years. **Location:** 沙雅监狱 ([Shaya](#) Prison).
- 21) [Emet Huseyin \(艾麦提·吾斯音\)](#). **Crime:** 利用极端主义破坏法律实施罪, 准备实施暴力恐怖罪 (“using extremism to damage law enforcement”). **Sentence:** 13 years, 11 months. **Location:** 兵团南口监狱 (Bingtuan Nankou Prison).
- 22) [Memet Memetimin \(麦麦提·麦麦提伊敏\)](#). **Crime:** 寻衅滋事罪 (“Picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour”). **Sentence:** 8 years. **Location:** 和田监狱 ([Hotan](#) Prison).
- 23) [Abdureyim Turdi \(阿布都热依穆·吐尔迪\)](#). **Crime:** 寻衅滋事罪 (“Picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour”). **Sentence:** 10 years. **Location:** 喀什监狱 (Kashgar Prison).
- 24) [Abdureshit Memet \(阿卜杜热西提·麦麦提\)](#). **Crime:** 寻衅滋事罪 (“Picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour”). **Sentence:** 10 years, **Location:** 阿克苏监狱 ([Aksu](#) Prison).
- 25) [Turghun Tursun \(图尔贡·图尔荪\)](#). **Crime:** 利用宗教极端破坏法律实施罪, 寻衅滋事罪 (“using religious extremism to undermine the implementation of law, Picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour”). **Sentence:** 13 years, 11 months. **Location:** 和田监狱 ([Hotan](#) Prison).
- 26) [Ablimit Abdurehim \(阿不力米提·阿不都热依木\)](#). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪、利用极端主义破坏法律实施罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order, using extremism to damage law enforcement”). **Sentence:** 10 years, 11 months. **Location:** 巴音郭楞监狱 (Bayinguoleng Prison).
- 27) [Turghun Tursun \(图尔贡·图尔荪\)](#). **Crime:** 利用极端主义破坏法律实施罪 (“using extremism to damage law enforcement”). **Sentence:** 12 years. **Location:** 沙雅监狱 ([Shaya](#) Prison).
- 28) [Reshit Ablimit \(热西提·阿卜力米提\)](#). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪、寻衅滋事罪、利用极端主义破坏法律实施罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order, picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour, using extremism to damage law enforcement”). **Sentence:** 19 years, 11 months. **Location:** 吐鲁番监狱 ([Turpan](#) Prison).

- 29) [Abduqeyyum Niyaz \(阿布都克尤穆·尼亚孜\)](#). **Crime:** 宣扬恐怖主义, 极端主义罪、煽动实施恐怖活动罪, 寻衅滋事罪 (“advocating terrorism and extremism, incitement to commit terrorist activities, picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour”). **Sentence:** 20 years. **Location:** 第一监狱 ([No.1 Prison, Urumqi](#)).
- 30) [Tayir Abdurahman \(塔伊尔·阿卜杜热合曼\)](#). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 7 years. **Location:** 和田监狱 ([Hotan Prison](#)).
- 31) [Musajan Mamut \(穆萨江·马木提\)](#). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪、宣扬恐怖主义、极端主义、煽动实施恐怖活动罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order, advocating terrorism and extremism, incitement to commit terrorist activities”). **Sentence:** 18 years, 11 months. **Location:** 吐鲁番监狱 ([Turpan Prison](#)).
- 32) [Atikem Tursun \(阿提开姆·图尔荪\)](#). **Crime:** 利用宗教极端破坏法律实施罪 (“using religious extremism to undermine the implementation of law”). **Sentence:** 8 years. **Location:** 女子监狱 ([Women’s prison](#)).
- 33) [Memetimin Ibrahim \(麦麦提敏·伊卜拉伊木\)](#). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪, 寻衅滋事罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order, picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour”). **Sentence:** 16 years, 11 months. **Location:** 第一监狱 ([No.1 Prison, Urumqi](#)).
- 34) [Mamutjan Reshit \(马穆提江·热西提\)](#). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 6 years, **Location:** 喀什监狱 ([Kashgar Prison](#)).
- 35) [Ekber Elim \(艾科拜尔·艾力木\)](#). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 7 years. **Location:** 阿克苏监狱 ([Aksu Prison](#)).
- 36) [Memeteli Obul \(麦麦提艾力·吾布力\)](#). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 7 years. **Location:** 第四监狱 ([No.4 Prison](#)).
- 37) [Nurmemetjan Semet \(努尔麦麦提江·赛麦提\)](#). **Crime:** 利用极端主义破坏法律实施罪、聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“using extremism to damage law enforcement, gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 10 years, 11 months. **Location:** 和田监狱 ([Hotan Prison](#)).

- 38) [Arslan Tohti \(阿尔斯兰·托胡提\)](#). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 6 years. **Location:** 沙雅监狱 ([Shaya Prison](#)).
- 39) [Memet Reshit \(麦麦提·热西提\)](#). **Crime:** 宣扬恐怖主义, 极端主义罪、煽动实施恐怖活动罪、聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“advocating terrorism and extremism, incitement to commit terrorist activities, gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 20 years. **Location:** 第一监狱 ([No.1 Prison, Urumqi](#)).
- 40) [Memetjan Obulqasim \(麦麦提江·吾布力卡斯穆\)](#). **Crime:** 利用极端主义破坏法律实施罪、寻衅滋事罪 (“using extremism to damage law enforcement, picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour”). **Sentence:** 13 years, 11 months. **Location:** 沙雅监狱 ([Shaya Prison](#)).
- 41) [Abdukerim Abdurehim \(阿布都克热穆·阿布都热依穆\)](#). **Crime:** 寻衅滋事罪、聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“Picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour, gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 15 years, 11 months. **Location:** 第三监狱 (No.3 Prison).
- 42) [Omer Abdurehim \(约麦尔·阿卜杜热伊木\)](#). **Crime:** 利用宗教极端破坏法律实施罪 (“using religious extremism to undermine the implementation of law”). **Sentence:** 5 years, 6 months. **Location:** 巴音郭楞监狱 ([Bayinguoleng Prison](#)).
- 43) [Abdurehim Yunus \(阿卜杜热伊木·尤努斯\)](#). **Crime:** 寻衅滋事罪 (“Picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour”). **Sentence:** 5 years. **Location:** 于田监狱 ([Yutian Prison](#)).
- 44) [Yasin Qadir \(亚森·喀迪尔\)](#). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 6 years. **Location:** 巴音郭楞监狱 ([Bayinguoleng Prison](#)).
- 45) [Tohti Qadir \(托合提·喀迪尔\)](#). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 7 years. **Location:** 喀什监狱 ([Kashgar Prison](#)).
- 46) [Imin Mamut \(依明·马穆提\)](#). **Crime:** 利用宗教极端破坏法律实施罪, 寻衅滋事罪 (“using religious extremism to undermine the implementation of law, picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour”). **Sentence:** 13 years, 11 months. **Location:** 吐鲁番监狱 ([Turpan Prison](#)).

- 47) [Memeteli Turaq \(麦麦提艾力·吐拉克\)](#). **Crime:** 寻衅滋事罪, 利用极端主义破坏法律实施罪, 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour, using extremism to damage law enforcement, gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 20 years. **Location:** 第一监狱 ([No.1 Prison](#), Urumqi).
- 48) [Yasin Tursun \(亚森·图尔荪\)](#). **Crime:** 利用宗教极端破坏法律实施罪, 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“using religious extremism to undermine the implementation of law, gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 10 years, 11 months. **Location:** 第四监狱 (No.4 Prison).
- 49) [Metrehim Memet \(麦提热伊木·麦麦提\)](#). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 7 years. **Location:** 巴音郭楞监狱 (Bayinguoleng Prison).
- 50) [Emet Semet \(艾麦提·赛麦提\)](#). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 5 years. **Location:** 新收犯监狱 ([Newly seized criminals Prison](#)).
- 51) [Abdukerim Urayim \(阿卜杜克热木·吾拉伊木\)](#). **Crime:** 宣扬恐怖主义, 极端主义罪、聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“advocating terrorism, gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 20 years. **Location:** 第三监狱 (No.3 Prison).
- 52) [Tursun Rozi \(图尔荪·如孜\)](#). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 7 years. **Location:** 乌苏监狱 ([Wusu Prison](#)).
- 53) [Memettursun Ablet \(麦麦提图尔荪·阿卜来提\)](#). **Crime:** 宣扬恐怖主义, 极端主义罪、聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“advocating terrorism, gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 20 years. **Location:** 吐鲁番监狱 ([Turpan Prison](#)).
- 54) [Seydimemet Kamal \(赛迪麦麦提·佻马力\)](#) **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 3 years. **Location:** 克孜勒苏监狱 ([Kizilsu Prison](#)).
- 55) [Omerjan Hoshur \(约麦尔江·吾舒尔\)](#). **Crime:** 寻衅滋事罪, 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour, gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 16 years, 11 months. **Location:** 第三监狱 (No.3 Prison).

- 56) [Tursun Ghopur \(图尔荪·吾普尔\)](#). **Crime:** 寻衅滋事罪 (“picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour”). **Sentence:** 6 years. **Location:** 和田监狱 ([Hotan Prison](#)).
- 57) [Turghun Imin \(图尔贡·伊敏\)](#). **Crime:** 利用极端主义破坏法律实施罪、聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“using extremism to damage law enforcement, gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 10 years, 11 months. **Location:** 兵团南口监狱 (Bingtuan Nankou Prison).
- 58) [Abdureshit Tursun \(阿卜杜热西提·图尔荪\)](#). **Crime:** 利用极端主义破坏法律实施罪、寻衅滋事罪 (“using extremism to damage law enforcement, picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour”). **Sentence:** 11 years, 11 months. **Location:** 沙雅监狱 ([Shaya Prison](#)).
- 59) [Ilhamjan Ghopur \(伊力哈木江·吾普尔\)](#). **Crime:** 宣扬恐怖主义，极端主义罪、煽动实施恐怖活动罪，聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“advocating terrorism and extremism, incitement to commit terrorist activities, gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 19 years. **Location:** 第三监狱 (No.3 Prison).
- 60) [Toqachgul Huseyin \(托喀齐古丽·约赛尹\)](#). **Crime:** 寻衅滋事罪 (“picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour”). **Sentence:** 10 years. **Location:** 女子监狱 ([Women’s prison](#)).
- 61) [Elijan Yasin \(艾力江·牙森\)](#). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪、寻衅滋事罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order, picking quarrels / disorderly behaviour”). **Sentence:** 16 years, 11 months. **Location:** 吐鲁番监狱 ([Turpan Prison](#)).
- 62) [Abdulla Ismayil \(阿布都拉·斯马依\)](#). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 7 years. **Location:** 克孜勒苏监狱 ([Kizilsu Prison](#)).
- 63) [Nurmemet Tursun \(努尔麦麦提·吐尔逊\)](#). **Crime:** 聚众扰乱社会秩序罪 (“gathering crowds to disrupt social order”). **Sentence:** 7 years. **Location:** 新源监狱 (Xinyu Prison).

Appendix – Witness testimony ([Muetter Iliquid](#))

My name is Muetter Iliquid, and I am an ethnic Uyghur born in Ghulja City, East Turkistan. In 2011, my family migrated to Norway and sought political asylum. I am a Norwegian citizen, and I currently reside in the UK.

I was raised in a politically active family. My father was a student at Xinjiang University in the 1990s. During college, he was involved in dozens of peaceful demonstrations against the Chinese regime, demanding freedom, democracy, and equality. Their slogans also confronted the issues of nuclear testing in Lop Nor, resettlement programs with the influx of Han people, and birth control policies targeting minorities. My father was arrested three times in his life, and his political background in the past brought uncertainties to our lives. In the end, we had no choice but to leave our homeland.

Growing up in a political family made a significant impact on me. Since my first years at the university, I have been actively involved in Uyghur rights related projects. As a youth, I was enthusiastic and dedicated to contributing to my people. However, I did not know how risky this would be for my family and me.

In 2019, I was working with local Uyghur advocacy groups in Norway, helping them to publish articles about the Uyghur crisis in Norwegian. I applied strict anonymity and shared no information even with my closest family and friends. I thought I could keep my family safe if I stayed anonymous. In the summer of 2020, I learned from an extended family member that my grandmother living in Ghulja was visited by the Chinese National Security Bureau. They arrived with printed versions of my Norwegian anonymous articles, and my grandmother received a “warning”, she was also forced to provide my contact details in Norway. I was

raised at my grandmother's house as a kid. The last time I spoke to her directly was in 2017, and the last thing she told me was never to call back again.

I learned my lesson from this experience, being anonymous is pointless, and I became more vocal and active publicly. In the summer of 2021, my cousin who's living abroad came to visit my family in Norway for the Eid celebration. A few days after my cousin's visit, her father, who lived in Urumqi was arrested unexpectedly. He was a police officer at a police station in Urumqi, he was a warmhearted man, he always did his best to help Uyghur people in need in the region. My uncle was charged with "two-faced tendencies". Nothing is more politically accusatory for Uyghur intellectuals and government officers than being labeled a "two-faced person". My uncle died during interrogation four days after his arrest, his family wasn't allowed to hold a funeral following Islamic traditions, and no one else was allowed to see his body except his wife. The local authorities announced that he died of a heart attack at work, and his family was told not to share any information about the reason for his death. A few months later, journalists from Radio Free Asia carried out an investigation into this case. The RFA found that the reason my uncle was charged as a "two-faced person" was due to his daughter's visit to Norway, he was blamed for having ties with "terrorist groups" abroad.

I never imagined my work would bring death to anyone. I feel guilty about my uncle's death. However, being on this path is like a one-way ticket. Once you are involved, there's no turning back. I do not know who is next to suffer in my family, but I hope the work that I do makes an impact on changing the tragic situation in my homeland.

Appendix – Authentication of documents ([Dr Hannah Theaker](#))

Document Authentication

Having reviewed a set of two documents relating to Beijing’s Xinjiang policy, I am confident that both can be authenticated as genuine. I received both documents in digital file format, provided to me by Dr. David Tobin in March 2022. Both documents were issued from within a single county-level administration unit in the north of Xinjiang. Given the sensitivities involved, details which could potentially identify the location in question have been suppressed in this report.

A two-part method was employed for authentication of the two documents. Firstly, the documents were reviewed for their stylistic adherence to the conventions governing Chinese government publications; secondly, their content was reviewed against publicly available sources and academic literature in order to corroborate details of policy, slogans and events mentioned therein.

The first document (hereafter no.1) is a cable (*dianbao* 电报). It carries a ‘most urgent’ (*titi* 特提) designation, but was not classified for secrecy (*mingdian* 明电). The document is complete, containing a total of 28 pages, which can be broken down into the main text of the cable (2 pages) and an appendix (26 pages). The document appears to have been printed out and stapled, which serves to explain the absence of a reception stamp, as electronically transmitted cables often merely have the printed signature alone. In font, heading, style and designation, the cable matches the prescribed formatting of this class of Chinese government document.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ For a representative example of the type of document in question, see the urgent telegram issued Bayingol Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture Party Education Work Committee given in Fig. 7, Adrian Zenz, “[“Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts”: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s Extrajudicial Internment Campaign](#)”, *Journal of Political Risk*, Vol. 7(11), 2019.

The cable was issued in August 2016 by the county-level stability leading group office (维护稳定领导小组办公室) and the comprehensive governance party committee office (社会治安综合治理委员会办公室). The main text comprises notification that materials on comprehensive government work and stability maintenance knowledge (*weiwen zhisbi* 维稳知识) will be included in annual tests for officials; the appendix contains 100 reference questions for officials to revise. Testing of required knowledge and skills (*ying zhi ying hui* 应知应会) are common for officials. The 100 questions cover many aspects of local policy, including procedures at local policing stations, for surveillance of local communities, correct ideological stances, the categories of people to be targeted, notable risks, how to resist cults (*xiejiao* 邪教), down to a long-running initiative to persuade locals to make monthly charitable donations. A majority of the content here can be confirmed in publicly available documents; for instance, the definition of “Four Looks” (*si kan* 四看) method for the recognition of cults is reproduced word-for-word on [an Inner Mongolia county party website article from 2017](#). As is typical for such tests of knowledge, many questions challenge officials to correctly define slogans, many of which are still in use (for instance, *yi gan san lv* 一感三率). Further details are verified by known outlines of post-2016 Xinjiang policy, notably the focus on individuals who had returned from Kazakhstan among those targeted for detention.

The second document (hereafter no. 2) is a transcript prepared from a recording of a speech given by a prefectural party secretary to a county-level work symposium. It is titled “Lecture given by Prefectural Party Secretary XXX to XXX County Conference” (地委书记口口口在口口口座谈会的讲话), with the date given on the line below in brackets. Below that is a statement noting that the transcript of the speech has been prepared from a recording, and that the transcript has not yet been approved by the speaker. The transcript is typed in the appropriate government font, but as an unissued document, it does not correspond to an official document type. The speech is complete and consists of 36 pages. The text of the speech further reflects the comparatively unedited nature of the transcript: it

is informal in style. Although it is punctuated, it still shows the natural rhythms of the Prefectural Party Secretary's speech.

The speech is dated to May 2018. The work symposium it was given at was not reported on in the local press, and I was unable to verify any further details of the event. Publicly available materials on the Party Secretary in question confirm his position at the time when the speech was made, and hence, his authority to lead such a symposium, whilst references to colleagues also accord with publicly available personnel records for the region. However, it is immediately apparent from the content that the Prefectural Party Secretary's address was not intended for public consumption, as his address provides a frank and detailed account of local party policy – quite distant from the sanitised progress reports that do make the local news. Numerous details within it can be verified, notably the inspection visit to the region made earlier in the same year by Provincial Party Secretary Chen Quanguo. Much of the speech is informed by the Prefectural Secretary's response to that same visit, and the satisfaction of high leadership with current work. Nevertheless, the Secretary notes that cadres must continue their work as dangers remain. The speech details the implementation of the policies outlined for cadres in document no.1, notably local policing enforcement, and further repeatedly references sentiments and policies found in Xi Jinping's speeches, as contained in the Xinjiang Papers. The timelines and policy details it gives are in accordance with known outlines of Xinjiang policy across this period.

To conclude, both documents can be authenticated with a high degree of confidence.

Dr Hannah Theaker

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